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Abstract
Information security problems typically involve decision makers who choose and adjust their be-
haviors in the interaction with each other in order to achieve their goals. Consequently, game
theoretic models can potentially be a suitable tool for better understanding the challenges that the
interaction of participants in information security scenarios bring about. In this dissertation, we
employ models and concepts of game theory to study a number of subjects in the field of informa-
tion security.
In the first part, we take a game-theoretic approach to the matter of preventing coercion in elec-
tions. Our game models for the election involve an honest election authority that chooses between
various protection methods with different levels of resistance and different implementation costs.
By analysing these games, it turns out that the society is better off if the security policy is publicly
announced, and the authorities commit to it.
Our focus in the second part is on the property of noninterference in information flow security.
Noninterference is a property that captures confidentiality of actions executed by a given process.
However, the property is hard to guarantee in realistic scenarios. We show that the security of a
system can be seen as an interplay between functionality requirements and the strategies adopted
by users, and based on this we propose a weaker notion of noninterference, which we call strategic
noninterference. We also give a characterisation of strategic noninterference through unwinding
relations for specific subclasses of goals and for the simplified setting where a strategy is given as
ii
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a parameter.
In the third part, we study the security of information flow based on the consequences of in-
formation leakage to the adversary. Models of information flow security commonly prevent any
information leakage, regardless of how grave or harmless the consequences the leakage can be.
Even in models where each piece of information is classified as either sensitive or insensitive, the
classification is “hardwired” and given as a parameter of the analysis, rather than derived from
more fundamental features of the system. We suggest that information security is not a goal in
itself, but rather a means of preventing potential attackers from compromising the correct behavior
of the system. To formalize this, we first show how two information flows can be compared by
looking at the adversary’s ability to harm the system. Then, we propose that the information flow
in a system is effectively secure if it is as good as its idealized variant based on the classical notion
of noninterference.
Finally, we shift our focus to the strategic aspect of information security in voting procedures.
We argue that the notions of receipt-freeness and coercion resistance are underpinned by existence
(or nonexistence) of a suitable strategy for some participants of the voting process. In order to
back the argument formally, we provide logical “transcriptions” of the informal intuitions behind
coercion-related properties that can be found in the existing literature. The transcriptions are for-
mulated in the modal game logic ATL∗, well known in the area of multi-agent systems.
I dedicate this thesis
to my father, for his endless encouragement to continue my progress in life,
and to my mother who always wishes me nothing but health and happiness.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Typically, most security problems by their nature involve the participation of independent decision
makers, often referred to as agents or players. These agents can be individuals, pieces of software
or devices that are capable of making decisions and taking actions. In the context of security prob-
lems, these agents may act selfishly, maliciously, or cooperatively. In these problems, malicious
players, often referred to as the adversary or the attacker, correspond to the agents whose goals are
opposed to, or not in agreement with the proper functionality of the system. These often choose
their attack methods strategically and intelligently to achieve their goals. Accordingly, there is an
underlying relationship between a security problem, and the motivations and strategic capabilities
of the agents involved. In this regard, game theoretic models can be used in information security
problems to both better understand the challenges of the problems, and to achieve more efficient
defence strategies for them. Game theory provides mathematical tools for modelling multi-agent
systems, where one agent’s outcome depends not only on his decisions but also on those of the
other players in the interaction, which is clearly the setting for most security scenarios.
One can apply game theory to the analysis of security problems on different levels. Here we
mention some of the approaches in which the study of information security can benefit from game
theoretic models. We should emphasise that these approaches are neither exhaustive nor disjoint.
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2One of the use cases of game theoretic models in the field of information security has to do
with expressing and analysing security properties that by definition include notions of strategy and
goal for the players involved. For instance, one such property is coercion-resistance in an e-voting
system. As we will see in more detail in Chapter 2, the informal definition of coercion-resistance in
the literature is often similar to the following statement: whatever strategy the coercer adopts, the
voter always has a strategy to vote as she intended while appearing to comply with all the coercer’s
requirements. Therefore, the intuition behind the property evidently includes strategies and goals
of the players. However, few works in this area have used game theoretic models to express and
analyse the coercion-resistance property.
Another approach for using game theoretical models and concepts in the field of information
security is to extend the security properties that do not explicitly include notions of strategy or goal,
to variants which consider these notions. This approach can help us to better understand, study,
and implement the information security properties in realistic situations in which agents follow
their goals strategically. For instance, noninterference (and its variants) denotes an information
flow security property that is meant to prevent the leakage of information about the activity of
a group of high clearance agents (or High players) to a group of low clearance agents (or Low
players). In general, noninterference is a very restrictive property and implementing it in a real
system is very difficult, sometimes even impossible. For this reason, several weaker notions of
noninterference have been proposed in the literature. For achieving a weaker yet practical notion
of noninterference, one may also take into account the strategies and goals of the players. On
the one hand, we can look at High players and what they consider to be the correct behaviour
of the system (which we can call the goal of the High players or the goal of the system). When
all the High players are trusted and well informed about their goal, we can expect them to follow
only those possible behaviours (strategies) that are in line with their goal. We can then relax the
noninterference property to prohibit information flow only in those runs of the system that follow
3these High players’ strategies. On the other hand, we can also focus on the goal of the adversaries
in an information security scenario, which can in general be stated as harming the goal of the
system, i.e., preventing the system from functioning correctly. The ability of the adversaries to
opt for a strategy that damages the goal of the system depends partly (but not only) on the amount
of information leaked to them from the High players. We can argue that we need to prevent the
leakage of only those pieces of information that increase the strategic ability of the adversary to
harm the goal of the system.
Models of game theory can also be used in the field of information security, not for defining or
expressing security properties, but also at the level of implementation, as a decision-making tool
for choosing the right security policy among the possible options. In this sense, game theory can be
seen as a means to analyse the economics of security, which is now an emerging area of study. By
taking into account the incentives and the information available to the players, game theory models
can help to allocate the limited resources for implementing different security measures in order to
balance the perceived security risks. One example of such situations is the security of elections.
For an election to function properly, several security properties have been defined. To obtain these
security properties, the decision makers of the election usually have a vast number of possible
measures and tools, each with a different level of security and a different cost of implementation.
Moreover, they also need to make decisions about higher level strategies, like whether or not to
publicly announce the details of their security measures, whether or not to allow polling before the
election, and who can have access to the results of the polling, etc. Game theoretic models can
shed light on these situations and help the decision makers to choose the right strategies, and also
to better understand the risks and the consequences of their chosen strategies.
Game models have also been used to provide a proof system for deciding security properties.
In this sense, the players and their strategies in the defined games usually do not represent the
actual agents taking a role in the security scenario and their respective possible strategies. Instead,
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they are serving as a mathematical tool to prove the security property in question.
1.1 Aims and Objectives
In this thesis, we take a game theoretical approach to the study of coercion-resistance in e-voting,
and information flow security. We can divide our aims and objectives into three main strands.
Each strand can be seen as representing one of the possible approaches to applying game theoretic
models in information security. For keeping this chapter more concise, we will give a more detailed
introduction about each strand in their respective chapters in the thesis.
1.1.1 Strand 1: Preventing Coercion in Elections
In this strand, we use game models to study coercion in elections. We analyse the strategies of the
coercer, and of the decision makers of an election in the process of deciding the security policies.
We try to find a strategy for the decision makers that minimises the damages that the coercion
would inflict upon what we consider to be the common good of the society.
Objective 1
To model and analyse an election system in the presence of potential coercers, in order to
find optimal strategies for the decision makers of the election, and to minimise the risk and
expected damage of coercion.
1.1.2 Strand 2: Information Flow Security and Strategic Abilities of Players
In this strand, we aim to explore new perspectives on information flow security by taking into
account the strategic abilities and goals of the players involved. We consider two approaches: The
first one is to focus on the goals of the High players and their strategic abilities to achieve these
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goals. The other one is to emphasise the strategic abilities of the Low players to harm the goal of
the system.
Objective 2.a
To define a weaker notion of noninterference by considering the strategic ability of the High
players and their incentive to ensure the correct behaviour of the system.
Objective 2.b
To study the significance of information flow in a system based on its influence on increasing
the strategic ability of the adversary to harm the goal of the system.
1.1.3 Strand 3: Expressing Receipt-Freeness and Coercion-Resistance in
Logics of Strategic Ability
In this part, we study the intuitions behind various definitions of receipt-freeness and coercion-
resistance properties in an election. Specifically, we would argue that these properties are usually
defined based on the existence (or nonexistence) of some suitable strategy for the participants in the
election. Therefore, game theoretic models seem appropriate for expressing and analysing these
properties.
Objective 3
To use logics of strategic ability to provide "transcriptions" of informal intuitions behind the
definitions of receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance properties in the literature.
1.2 Contributions
The first contribution of this dissertation addresses Objective 1 of the thesis. We present game
models for an election in the presence of a coercer, both in complete and incomplete information
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settings. We study the models based on different solution concepts: Nash equilibrium, Stack-
elberg equilibrium and minmax. The results of this study show that in general, announcing the
security methods publicly before the election and committing to following them are beneficial for
minimising the risk and expected damage of coercion.
The second contribution of this dissertation follows Objective 2.a. In this part, we show that
the security of a system can be seen as an interplay between the functionality requirements of
the system and the strategies adopted by the players. We then define a security property called
strategic noninterference, which weakens the standard notions of noninterference by taking into
account only those runs of the system that are in line with the strategies of the High players,
assuming that they intend to ensure the correctness of the system. We also give a characterization
of strategic noninterference through unwinding relations for some subclasses of goals and for the
simplified setting where the strategy of the High players is provided as a parameter.
The third contribution addresses Objective 2.b. We suggest that information security is not a
goal in itself, but rather a means of preventing potential attackers from compromising the correct
behaviour of the system. To formalise this, we first show how two information flows can be
compared by looking at the adversary’s ability to harm the system. Then, we propose that the
information flow in a system is effectively secure if it does not allow for more damage than its
idealised variant based on the classical notion of noninterference. This contribution includes a
definition of the noninterferent idealised variant of the system and its uniqueness theorem.
The fourth contribution of the thesis aims at exploring Objective 3. We argue that the no-
tions of receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance are underpinned by existence (or nonexistence)
of a suitable strategy for some participants of the voting process. To back the argument formally,
we provide logical "transcriptions" of the informal intuitions behind the definitions of coercion-
resistance properties in the literature. The transcriptions are formulated in the modal game logic
ATL∗, well known in the area of multi-agent systems.
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1.3 Outline
We have structured this dissertation in nine chapters. In the following, we outline the contents of
each chapter.
Chapter 2: On Formal Definitions of Receipt-Freeness and Coercion-Resistance. This
chapter serves as a partial literature review for strands 1 and 3 of the thesis. We first give an
overview of some of the standard methodologies for obtaining proofs for security properties. Next,
we present a brief literature review on the formal definitions of receipt-freeness and coercion-
resistance properties. Then we take a closer look at some of the significant works that have given
formal definitions of these properties.
Chapter 3: Towards Game-Theoretic Analysis of Coercion Resistance. This chapter serves
as a preliminary for Objective 1 of the thesis. We explain normal form representation of games and
some of the important solution concepts for them. We then take a look at incomplete information
games and one of their important solution concepts, the Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Chapter 4: Preventing Coercion in Elections, a Game Theoretic Approach. This is the
main chapter related to Objective 1 of the thesis. First, we take a look at related works. Then,
we present a game model in normal form for an election in the presence of coercion. The players
in the game consist of an “honest election authority” who acts on behalf of society, and a coercer
who may try to change the result of the election by coercing the voters. We analyse the games
using different solution concepts for normal form games. Furthermore, we extend our model to
incorporate an incomplete information setting where players are not certain about the number of
the voters that the coercer needs to coerce to change the result of the election.
Chapter 5: Strategies and Information Flow: Preliminaries. This chapter is a preliminary
for Objective 2 of the thesis. First, we give a brief literature review on the noninterference property
and its variants. Then, we present the transition network model, which is similar to the one used in
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the original definition of noninterference in the seminal work of Goguen and Meseguer [GM82].
We also explain some related terminologies which will be used further in the thesis. In the next part,
we present the definition of the standard noninterference property based on the transition network
model. Then, we present the unwinding relation which is a characterization of the noninterference
property. Lastly, formal definitions of the strategies and the temporal goals of the players in a
transition network model are explained.
Chapter 6: Strategic Noninterference. This is the main chapter contributing to Objective 2.a
of the thesis. We start with a motivating example, and then present an overview of related works.
In the next section, we propose our new concept of strategic noninterference. We give a proof
showing that a tractable characterization of strategic noninterference in its general form does not
exist. Then, we present characterizations of this property for certain classes of goals, and for a
setting where the strategy of the High players is given as a parameter.
Chapter 7: Effective Security. This chapter includes the main results related to Objective 2.b
of the thesis. We begin by presenting a motivating example, and then continue by taking a look at
related works. We define the concept of effective security as a means to compare the security of
two models based on the strategic abilities of the adversary to harm the goal of the system. Then
we look more specifically at information flow security and show how it can be defined based on the
relation between the attacker’s observational capabilities and his ability to compromise the goals
of the system. We define the noninterferent idealised variant of a system, as a variant which does
not allow any relevant information flow by construction. Finally, we extend our results to models
that are not total on input (unlike the transition network models of Goguen and Meseguer[GM82]).
Chapter 8: Expressing Receipt-Freeness and Coercion-Resistance in Logics of Strategic
Ability. This chapter contains the contribution of the thesis towards Objective 3. We begin by
explaining the motivation and by giving an overview of related works. The next part includes a
preliminary section on logics of the strategic ability ATL and ATL∗. In the rest of the chapter, we
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go through some of the significant works introducing formal definitions of the receipt-freeness and
coercion-resistance properties and give a transcription of the intuition behind their definitions in
the logic of strategic ability ATL∗.
Chapter 9: Conclusion and Future Works. In this chapter we discuss the results presented
throughout the thesis and outline some of the future works regarding each strand.
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Information Security Conference. Springer International Publishing, 2015.
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tional Workshop on AI for Privacy and Security (PrAISe), 2016.
• Jamroga, Wojtek and Masoud Tabatabaei. “Information Security as Strategic (In)effectivity.”
12th International Workshop on Security and Trust Management (STM), 2016.
• Jamroga, Wojciech, and Masoud Tabatabaei. “Information Security as Strategic (In)effectivity
(Extended Version).” arXiv preprint arXiv:1608.02247 (2016).
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Chapter 2
On Formal Definitions of Receipt-Freeness
and Coercion-Resistance
Voting is a mechanism of utmost importance to social processes, as many important decisions for
the society are made through elections and referenda. Digital technology holds out the promise
of greater citizen engagement in decision-making. Throughout the history of democracy, elections
have been the target of attempts to manipulate the outcome. To counter the threats of coercion or
vote buying, ballot confidentiality was recognised an important property of voting systems. More
recently, cryptographers and security experts have been looking at using cryptographic mecha-
nisms to provide voter-verifiability, i.e., the ability of voters to confirm that their votes are correctly
registered and counted. Voter-verifiability strengthens the integrity of the voting procedure, but,
if it is not done carefully, it can introduce new threats to confidentiality. This leads to the intro-
duction of more sophisticated notions: receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance. Receipt-freeness
focuses on the resources needed to construct a coercion attack and requires that the voter can ob-
tain no certified information (a receipt) which could be used to prove to a coercer that she voted
in a certain way. Coercion-resistance, on the other hand, is intended to capture broader security
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concerns, guided by the following intuition: whatever strategy the coercer adopts, the voter always
has a strategy to vote as they intend while appearing to comply with all the coercer’s requirements.
In this chapter, we take a look at formal definitions of receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance
properties in the literature. The content of this chapter serves as a part of literature review for
Objectives 1 and 3 of the thesis (Chapters 4 and 8).
Outline of the chapter. In Section 2.1 we have an overview on more conventional methodologies
and models used for obtaining proofs of security properties. Section 2.2 contains a brief litera-
ture review on the development of the formal definitions of the properties of receipt-freeness and
coercion-resistance. Then in Section 2.3 we take a closer look at some of the significant works
that have presented formal definitions of these properties. Finally in Section 2.4 we concludes the
chapter.
2.1 Common Methods for Modeling the Security Protocols
In order to obtain proofs that security protocols are correct, one first needs to model them math-
ematically. Two types of models that are commonly used for providing proofs of security for the
protocols are symbolic models and computational models. In the following, a brief overview of
these models is provided.
Symbolic models: In the symbolic model, the cryptographic primitives are represented by func-
tions considered as black-boxes. The messages are terms on these functions. In this model, the
adversary is restricted to compute only using the given functions. Moreover the only equalities
that hold are those explicitly given by equations in the model. So, this model assumes perfect
cryptography. For instance, if shared-key encryption is modeled by two function enc and dec and
the equality dec(enc(x,k),k) = x, then the adversary can decrypt enc(x,k) only when she has the
key k. The symbolic model is in particular suitable for automation.
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Computational (Cryptographic) models: In computational models, the messages are bitstrings
and the cryptographic primitives are functions from bitstrings to bitstrings. The adversary is any
probabilistic Turing machine. A security property is considered to hold when the probability that
it does not hold is negligible in a security parameter (which is normally the length of a key used
in the protocol). For instance, shared-key encryption can be modeled by two functions enc and
dec with the dec(enc(x,k),k) = x. Then the security of encryption is expressed by saying that
the adversary has a negligible probability of distinguishing encryptions of two messages of the
same length. The computational model is much more realistic, but the proofs are usually more
complicated, and these proofs are often only manual.
One can also see two main approaches to defining security properties in computational mod-
els. One is referred to as “simulation-based models” and the other “game-based models”. In a
simulation-based security definition, besides the real world, we also consider an ideal world. The
ideal world often doesn’t involve any cryptography and usually is defined regarding the physical
security assumptions. We would say a cryptographic scheme is now secure if any ’attack’ possible
in the real world can also be applied to the ideal functionality in the ideal world. In a game-based
security definition, the security is defined by a game between a challenger and an adversary. Usu-
ally, the challenger has access to all secret parameters, whereas the adversary only has access to
some oracles (e.g., public hash functions) plus whatever is given by the challenger during the game
(e.g. public parameters). The adversary then provides some output depending on the defined chal-
lenge. The advantage of an adversary roughly corresponds to how much ’better’ the adversary can
do at the game than a trivial adversary that just guesses its output. A cryptographic scheme is said
to satisfy the security definition if and only if no ’efficient’ adversary has a substantial advantage
in the game.
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2.2 A Brief Literature Review
In 1994, Benolah and Tuinstra [BT94] introduced receipt-freeness as a required property for avoid-
ing coercion in e-voting systems. Later Michels et al. [MH96] extended the concept by consid-
ering different levels of voter-control for the coercers, and varying levels of collusion between
the coercer and other parties in the election. Okamoto and Tatsuaki [Oka98] developed the for-
mal definition of [BT94] to make it more appropriate for large scale elections. In 2005, Juels et
al. [JCJ05] introduced coercion-resistance as the property of being receipt-freeness, plus resisting
against randomization, forced abstention and simulation attacks.
Delaune et al. have a series of works [DKR05, DKR06, DKR10] in which they have for-
malised receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance properties in applied pi calculus. Moran and Naor
[MN06] introduced a simulation based definition for coercion-resistance. Backes et al. [BHM08]
introduced a definition of coercion-resistance in the symbolic model which was more suitable for
automation than previous works. Meng [Men09] provided a state of the art survey on the defini-
tions of receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance and on what technologies are used at the time to
implement these properties in voting schemes.
Kuesters et al. [KTV10] introduced a formalisation of coercion-resistance which could provide
a probabilistic measure of the amount of coercion-resistance in a voting scheme. Dreier et al.
[DLL12] provided formal definitions of various privacy notions in applied pi calculus, and showed
how they are related to each other. Also, some works such as [JP06, BRS07, KT09] have used
formal logic to express coercion-resistance property in elections.
Several works such as [MBC01, LK03, ALBD04, LBD+04, KH04, WAB07, ARR+10b, SHKS12],
without introducing new definitions of receipt freeness and coercion-resistance properties, have
developed weaker, more practical, or more efficient ways to realize the needed assumptions for
achieving these properties (assumptions such as existence of untappable channels, anonymous
channels, etc.).
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2.3 Some of the Significant Works
1994: Receipt-free secret ballot elections [BT94]
This paper introduced the notion of receipt-freeness. They used some examples to show why
giving a “receipt” to the voter can be harmful, as it prevents the voter from being able to deceive
the coercer. Consequently, it defines receipt-freeness exactly as the property of "not giving the
voter any receipt during the election that makes her able to prove that her vote was cast in a
particular way". Through the paper “uncoercibility” is regarded equivalent to receipt freeness.
The formal definition of “uncoercability” in this paper is given in computational model. It
assumes two possible protocols (choices) for the voter. The property requires that firstly the coercer
needs to have same public views over the runs of the election for the two choices. Secondly, a
voter does not get to have a “receipt” from its private info that can be used as a proof to show what
protocol she has used.
2005: Coercion-resistant electronic elections [JCJ05]
This paper introduced the coercion-resistance property. They argue that in real world scenarios,
receipt-freeness is too weak. Because it fails to protect an election system against several forms of
serious, real-world attack, namely randomization attack, forced abstention attack, and simulation
attack. Briefly, in the randomization attack, the coercer asks the voter to use some randomization
method for choosing her vote. In the forced abstention attack, the attacker wants the voter to avoid
voting, and in the simulation attack, the attacker himself simulate the role of the voter (for example
by causing her to divulge her private keying material after the registration, but before the election
process).
So, the paper suggests that the coercion-resistance property is one that besides not enabling
the voter to produce a proof of his vote, can also protect against randomization, forced abstention
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and simulation attacks. The formal definition of coercion-resistance in the paper is given in com-
putational model and as a game based definition. The game is between the adversary and a voter
targeted by the adversary for a coercive attack. The structure of the game is as follows: a coin
is flipped, and the outcome is represented by a bit b. If b = 0, then the voter casts a ballot of its
choice and provides the adversary with a false voting key. In other words, the voter attempts to
evade adversarial coercion. If b= 1 on the other hand, then the voter submits to the coercion of the
adversary. She merely provides the adversary with her valid voting key and does not cast a ballot
herself. The challenge of the adversary is to guess the value of the coin b, that is, to determine
whether or not the targeted voter, in fact, cast a ballot. A coercion resistant voting system is thus
one that, no efficient adversary has a non-negligible advantage in this game.
2005: Receipt-freeness: Formal definition and fault attacks [DKR05]
This paper proposed a formalisation of receipt-freeness in the symbolic model, in applied pi cal-
culus. It also comments on that if one wants to satisfy both the receipt-freeness property and the
individual verifiability property, then some restriction on the communication between the voter and
the coercer is needed (Individual verifiability guarantees that a voter can obtain proof that her vote
was counted in the final tally of the election.).
The formal definition of receipt-freeness in this paper is based on the concept of observational
indistinguishability of processes. Intuitively, a voting protocol is receipt-free if for all voters A, the
process in which A votes according to the intruder’s wishes is indistinguishable from the one in
which she votes something else, even if all secrets are (apparently) shared with the intruder. The
definition also demands the existence of some counterbalancing voter B with whom voter A swaps
her vote, to avoid the case in which the intruder can distinguish the situations merely by counting
the votes at the end.
2006: Coercion-resistance and receipt-freeness in electronic voting [DKR06]
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In this work the authors have continued on their previous works and provided formal definitions
of coercion-resistance and receipt-freeness in applied pi calculus. They stated that the difference
between the definition of coercion-resistance and receipt-freeness lies in the powers of the coercer
to interact with the voter during the voting stage. In receipt freeness, the assumption is that the
coercer just examines evidence gained from observing the election process, including those pro-
vided by the cooperating voter (e.g., the voter’s private key and random coins used for probabilistic
encryption). In coercion-resistance on the other hand, the coercer has additional capabilities, as
he can interact with the cooperating voter (e.g., by adaptively preparing messages which the voter
will send during the process).
2006: Receipt-free universally-verifiable voting with everlasting privacy [MN06]
This work gives a formal definition for receipt-freeness in computation model, as a simulation-
based definition. They state that a receipt-free protocol must specify, in addition to the strategy
for honest voters, a coercion strategy. When a voter is coerced by the adversary, she begins fol-
lowing the coercion strategy. The coercion strategy tells the voter how to fake its responses to the
adversary.
The formal definition uses the real world vs. the ideal world model. In the ideal world model,
the only interaction between the parties is the public outputs of the election. Loosely speaking,
a protocol is receipt free if any coercion attack that the adversary can do in the real world, it can
also do in the ideal world. This may require that in the real world the coerced voter switches to
a “coercion strategy”, which specifies how to respond to coercer’s queries and commands. The
authors also have stated that even when a protocol is receipt-free by this definition, it may still be
possible to coerce the voters. What the definition does promise is that if it is possible to coerce a
voter in the real world, it is also possible to coerce her in the ideal world.
2008: Automated verification of remote electronic voting protocols in the applied pi-calculus
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[BHM08]
In this paper, a formalisation of coercion-resistance and receipt-freeness in applied pi calculus
is presented. It improves on the definitions from [DKR06] by introducing a formal definition
which is more suitable for automation, and also taking forced abstention attacks into consideration.
They define coercion resistance as the immunity to the simulation attacks and later prove that this
definition implies both the immunity to the forced abstention attacks and receipt-freeness (They
didn’t address the randomization attacks in this paper).
The idea of the formal definition can be expressed as follows: One considers two processes
for the voter, one which complies with the request of the coercer and one which “cheats” and in
which the voter provides the coercer with some fake information while voting as she intends. Then
the property states that the two processes (running in parallel with other voters and the the voting
system itself) must be observational equivalent for the coercer.
2010: A game-based definition of coercion-resistance and its applications [KTV10]
This work gives a formal definition of coercion-resistance in the form of a game-based definition.
A game is defined in which the coerced voter chooses either to follow the strategy given by the
coercer or to follow a counter-strategy which results as she intended. The definition states that for
any coercer, the probability of the coercer guessing correctly the choice of the coerced voter must
be less than some given value δ . The minimum value of δ for which this property holds can also
be used for measuring the coercion-resistance property in a system.
2012: A formal framework for modelling coercion resistance and receipt freeness [HS12]
This work introduces a formal framework in the symbolic model, in process algebra CSP, for
modelling different definitions of coercion-resistance in the literature. The framework is intended
to help analysing a voting system to see which of the definitions it satisfies.
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The framework is based on a process equivalence between the coercer’s view of the voting
system when the voter follows his instruction, and when the voter follows some behaviour that
results in her deliberate choice of candidate. The general definition states that for any coercer
and any instructed strategy, there must exist a voter process such that the process equivalence is
satisfied. Different flavours of coercion-resistance then can be modelled by modifying the process
instructed by the coercer.
2.4 Summary
In this chapter, we had a brief overview on some of the significant works that have formalised the
receipt-freeness and the coercion-resistance properties. In Chapter 8 we return to some of these
works, and will use logics of strategic abilities to express the informal definition behind each of
them. Also in Chapter 4 we model an election system in the presence of possible coercion and
a set of security measures available for implementation. However in that chapter we take these
measures as some methods and won’t mention any technical details about them.
Chapter 3
Towards Game-Theoretic Analysis of
Coercion Resistance
Game theory is the mathematical study of interaction (conflict and cooperation) between agents
who are pursuing their own interests (which may or may not be in conflict with other agents’
interests). Game theory has vastly been used in disciplines such as economics, biology, sociology,
computer science and political science, among others.
Because of the nature of the security problem scenarios, which usually consists of interactions
between defenders and attackers, game theory is well-suited as a tool for studying these situations.
In this chapter, we review the models of normal form games with both complete and incomplete
information of players, together with some solution concepts that we will use in the following
chapters.
Outline of the chapter. Section 3.1 explains modelling the games in normal form, and the concept
of mixed strategies in normal form games. In Section 3.2 we present some of the important solution
concepts for the games in normal form. In Section 3.3, we take a look at incomplete information
games, and explain the Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Finally Section 3.4 concludes the chapter.
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3.1 Games in Normal Form
Representing a game in normal form - also known as the strategic form - is the most common way
of modelling the interaction between the agents in game theory. When a game is represented in
normal form, it is usually assumed that the players choose their actions simultaneously, or at least
without knowing the action selected by other players beforehand. In a game represented in normal
form, the utility of each player is uniquely determined by the actual state of the world, which is in
its turn determined uniquely by the players’ combined actions. While explaining the games with
incomplete information in section 3.3, we will see that even when we consider that the state of the
world depends on some randomness in the environment, we still can model the game in normal
form.
Definition 3.1.1 (Normal form game). A finite normal form game with n player is a tuple 〈N,Σ,u〉,
where:
• N is a finite set of n players,
• Σ= Σ1×·· ·×Σn, where Σi is a the set of actions available to player i,
• u = (u1, · · · ,un), where ui : Σ→ R is a utility (or payoff) function for player i.
a = (a1, · · · ,an) ∈ Σ is called an action profile. A game in normal form for two players is
usually represented by a matrix, where the rows of the matrix represents the actions of the first
player and the columns represents the actions of the second player. The utility of each player for
each action profile is written in the corresponding cell of the matrix.
Example 3.1.1 (Prisoner’s Dilemma). Figure 3.1 shows a normal form representation for a famous
example in game theory which is called the “prisoner’s dilemma”. The story is about two prisoners
who are captured by the police for committing a crime. The two prisoners have two choices, either
to confess to the crime, or to deny it. If they both deny the crime they are both sentenced to stay
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Deny Confess
Deny −1,−1 −5,0
Confess 0,−5 −3,−3
Figure 3.1 The matrix representation of normal form model of the prisoner’s dilemma
scenario
one year in prison. If they both confess then they are both sentenced to stay three years in prison,
and if one confesses and the other one denies then the prisoner who confessed is released, and the
one who denied stays five years in prison.
We can represent the prisoner’s dilemma in normal form, as the tuple 〈N,Σ,u〉 where N =
{p1, p2} is the set of two players (prisoners); Σ = Σ1 × Σ2 is the set of action profiles where
Σ1=Σ2 = {D,C} are the sets of actions for the two players (D representing to deny and C repre-
senting to confess); and u = (u1,u2) is the utility function of the players defined by u1(D,D) =
u2(D,D) =−1, u1(C,C) = u2(C,C) =−5, u1(D,C) = u2(C,D) =−3, and u1(C,D) = u2(D,C) =
0.
In Figure 3.1 each row of the matrix shows one possible action for the first player and each
column represents one possible action for the second player. The four possible outcomes based
on these actions are described by the four cells of the matrix. In each cell, the first element is the
utility of the first player and the second element the utility of the second player.
3.1.1 Strategies in Normal Form Games
Strategies represent the choices of the players in a game. A pure strategy of a player expresses the
selection of a single possible action by that player. We call a tuple of pure strategies for each of
the players in the game a pure strategy profile. We will denote a pure strategy of a player, and a
pure strategy profile, respectively by the same notation we use for a player’s action and an action
profile.
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A player may also decide to randomise between its possible actions based on some probability
distribution. We call such a randomised choice a mixed strategy of a player. If D is a set, we show
the set of all probability distribution over members of D by ∆(D).
Definition 3.1.2 (Mixed strategies). If 〈N,Σ,u〉 is a normal form game, then the set of mixed
strategies of player i is Si = ∆(Σi).
Also S = S1×·· ·×Sn is the set of all strategy profiles. By si(a j) we denote the probability of
an action a j ∈ Σi being played under strategy si of player i.
Definition 3.1.3 (Expected utility of a mixed strategy). Given a normal form game 〈N,Σ,u〉, the
expected utility ui of player i for the mixed strategy profile s ∈ S is defined as
ui(s) = ∑
a∈Σ
ui(a)
n
∏
j=1
s j(a j)
If s= 〈s1, · · · ,si, · · · ,sn〉 ∈ Σ is a strategy profile and i is a player in the game, we may represent
s by (si,s−i) where s−i = 〈s1, · · · ,si−1,si+1, · · · ,sn〉. Similarly, we may represent an action profile
a ∈ Σ, by a = (ai,a−i).
Definition 3.1.4 (Best response). The best response of player i to the strategy profile s−i is a mixed
strategy s∗i ∈ Si such that ui(s∗i ,s−i)≥ ui(si,s−i) for all strategies si ∈ Si.
A best response action (pure strategy) of a player is defined in a similar way. We call a strategy
si a dominant strategy of player i, if it is a best response to all strategy profiles s−i ∈ S1×·· ·Si−1×
Si+1×·· ·Sn. A dominant action (pure strategy) of a player is also defined similarly.
Example 3.1.2. In Figure 3.2 , the best response of the first player for each action of the second
player is depicted in blue. Also, the best response of the second player for each action of the first
player is represented in red.
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Deny Confess
Deny −1,−1 −5,0
Confess 0,−5 −3,−3
Figure 3.2 The best responses of players for each action of the other player is depicted in
color. The Nash equilibrium is at (Confess, Confess).
3.2 Solution Concepts for Normal Form Games
In game theory, solution concepts are used to define which collective behaviours are “rational” and
should (or may) be selected by the players in a game. Different solution concepts correspond to
different notions of rationality. More precisely, they correspond to different models of the delib-
eration process that leads to selecting one or the other strategy. In this section, we provide a brief
overview of three such concepts that we will also use in the following chapters: maxmin, Nash
equilibrium and Stackelberg equilibrium.
3.2.1 Maxmin
Maxmin for player i selects the strategy of player i which guarantees the best minimal outcome
of the strategy. In a way, it boils down to assuming that the other players may try to inflict as
much damage as possible to i. Therefore, one may argue that maxmin captures decision making of
“paranoid” agents.
Definition 3.2.1 (Maxmin). The maximin strategy for player i is defined as
arg maxsimins−iui(si,s−i)
.
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3.2.2 Nash Equilibrium
Nash equlibrium represents a play which can emerge when players adapt their choices to what they
expect from the other players. Formally, a strategy profile s ∈ S is a Nash equilibrium iff no player
can unilaterally change her strategy in s so that she increases her utility (the strategies of the other
players are assumed to stay the same). Nash equilibrium often captures the collective behaviour
that emerges “organically”, through a sequence of strategy adjustments from different players that
leads to a point when nobody is tempted to change their strategy anymore.
Example 3.2.1. In Figure 3.2, the Nash equilibrium of the game is at (Confess, Confess), where
each player’s action is the best response to the other players action.
3.2.3 Stackelberg Equilibrium
Stackelberg equilibrium represents a rational play in a game with a designated leader player. The
leader has the power to choose her action first. She can also publicly commit to her choice so that
the other players are fully aware of it. Formally, Stackelberg equilibrium is defined as the best
response to the best response. That is, for every strategy si of the leader (player i) we find the
response s−i that maximizes the utilities of the opponents; then, we select the si which maximizes
ui(si,s−i).
It is important to notice that when the Stackelberg equilibrium and maxmin of a player co-
incide, the leader does not have an incentive to commit openly to her strategy: if the opponents
don’t choose the best respond, the leader can only gain by that but never lose. Conversely, when
Stackelberg equilibrium is different from maxmin, the leader is better off openly committing to her
policy because this way she forces the other players to respond in a desirable way.
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3.3 Games with Incomplete Information
So far in the games we discussed, all the players know what game is being played. In other words,
the number of players, the actions available to each player, and the payoff of all players for each
action profile are all common knowledge among all the players. In this section, we look at games
with incomplete information, also known as Bayesian games, where players may be uncertain
about some aspects of the game being played.
Harsanyi [HS72] suggested that one can simulate the uncertainties about the games being
played, and also about the beliefs of the other players about the game being played, by introducing
nature as an additional player that chooses the actual game based on some probability distribution.
One assumption we make is that all the possible games have the same number of agents and the
same strategy space for each agent. There are various ways of formalising Bayesian games. We
use the following definition in this work:
Definition 3.3.1 (Bayesian game). A Bayesian game with n player is a tuple 〈N,Ω,Σ,T,τ, p,u〉,
where:
• N is a finite set of n players,
• Ω is a finite set of states of the nature. Eech state of the nature uniquely determines one of
the possible games being played.
• Σ= Σ1×·· ·×Σn, where Σi is a the set of actions available to player i,
• T = T1× ·· ·×Tn, where Ti is the set of possible signals that may be observed by player i
and gives her some information about the game being played. We call each ti ∈ Ti a type of
player i.
• τ = (τ1, · · · ,τn), where τi : Ω→ Ti decides the signal observed by player i for a given state
of the nature. In other words τi decides the type of player i for each state of the nature.
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• p= (p1, · · · , pn), where pi ∈ ∆(Ω) is the probability distribution over the states of the nature
for player i. It holds that pi(τ−1i (ti))> 0 for all ti ∈ Ti.
• u= (u1, · · · ,un), where ui :Ω×Σ→R is a utility (or payoff) function for player i. The payoff
of a player depends both on the action profile chosen by the players, and on the actual state
of the nature.
A strategy of a player in a Bayesian game assigns choices for the player for each of the player’s
type. Therefore a mixed strategy of a player is defined as si : Ti→ ∆(Σi). We show the set of all
mixed strategy profiles of a Bayesian game by Sˆ. By si(ti,ai) we denote the probability of choosing
action ai by player i when its type is ti. The expected utility of a mixed strategy given a state of the
nature is defined similarly to the Definition 3.1.2 :
Definition 3.3.2 (Expected utility for a given state of nature). Given a Bayesian game 〈N,Ω,Σ,T,τ, p,u〉,
the expected utility ui of player i for the mixed strategy profile s ∈ Sˆ in the state of the nature ω is
defined as
ui(ω,s) = ∑
a∈Σ
ui(ω,a)
n
∏
j=1
s j(τ j(ω),a j)
Next, we calculate the ex-ante expected utility of a player for a given strategy profile. This is
the expected utility of a player, assuming that the player does not know its type.
Definition 3.3.3 (Ex-ante expected utility). Given a Bayesian game 〈N,Ω,Σ,T,τ, p,u〉, the ex-ante
expected utility uˆi : S→ R of player i for the mixed strategy profile s ∈ Sˆ is defined as
uˆi(s) = ∑
ω∈Ω
pri(ω) ·ui(ω,s).
Now we can transform construct a normal form game where the possible choices (actions) of
players are the strategies they can take in the Bayesian game, and their utility function is the ex-ante
3.4 Summary 27
expected utility of them in the Bayesian game. The Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the Bayesian
game is then defined as the Nash equilibrium of this new game in normal form.
Definition 3.3.4 (Bayesian Nash equilibirum). The Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the Bayesian
game 〈N,Ω,Σ,T,τ, p,u〉, is defined to be the Nash equilibrium of normal form game 〈N, Sˆ, uˆ〉.
3.4 Summary
In this section, we had an overview of some of the important concepts in game theory. We use most
of the material explained in this chapter in Chapter 4. We will meet the concept of the strategy
again in Chapters 6, 7 and 8. However in those chapters we use the term with a different nuance
(as will be explained in Chapter 5) which is closer to the definition of the strategy in the games in
extensive form (not covered in this chapter).
Chapter 4
Preventing Coercion in Elections, a Game
Theoretic Approach
As we have seen in Chapter 2, receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance are considered essen-
tial properties of voting systems that are intended to counter threats of coercion or vote buying.
Achieving coercion-resistance is extremely challenging, especially in the context of the internet
and remote voting (e.g. postal). A number of schemes have been proposed that provide it, but
typically this comes at a cost, in particular in terms of usability. In this chapter, we take a game
theoretic approach to analyse the trade-offs between the costs of implementing coercion-resistance
mechanisms on one hand, and the costs to the society due to the coercion attacks on the other hand.
Unlike most existing works, we do not propose a new coercion-resistant voting scheme, nor
prove that a scheme is secure in that respect. Instead, we focus on the context of coercion attempts
in e-voting, namely costs and benefits of involved parties. The main question we try to answer is:
Should the society invest in coercion-resistant procedures, and if so, in what way?. We do not aim
at devising a secure voting procedure, but rather at exposing conditions under which security of a
procedure is relevant at all.
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Here we do not represent the coercion resistance property of a voting system explicitly. Instead,
we model the coercion resistance level as a simple scalar, usually indicating how much effort/cost
it would take to break it. Also, our game-theoretic models are very simple: the society’s interests
are represented by a single agent that we call the “election authority” and there is only one coercer
in the game. We also study two cases; First we consider a case where the structure of the game
(i.e., strategies and their outcomes) are common knowledge among the participants. Hence we
model it as a normal form game with complete information. Then we consider the uncertainty of
the players about some parameters of the game, modelling it as a strategic game with incomplete
information of players.
Outline of the chapter. Section 4.1 contains a literature review of related works. In Section 4.2
we present a game model for an election in the presence of possible coercion, where the players
involved have complete information about the game being played. We start with a model where a
perfectly secure method is available for being implemented by the authority player, and then extend
it to a model where none of the available methods is perfectly secure. In Section 4.3 we study the
setting where players have incomplete information about the number of voters that is needed to
be coerced by the coercer to change the result of the election. We consider both a uniform and a
normal probability distribution for this number, and in each case we study the solution concepts
for the resulting incomplete information game model. We conclude the chapter in Section 4.4.
4.1 Related Works
Related work can be roughly divided into three strands: definitions of the concept of the coercion-
resistance (and its relation to privacy), proposals of coercion-resistant voting procedures, and stud-
ies of the context of coercion-resistance.
The works in the first strand is discussed in detailed in Chapter 2. The second strand over-
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laps with the first: [JCJ05, GGR09] all propose voting protocols that satisfy their definitions of
coercion-resistance while [KTV10] proves coercion resistance of two previously existing proto-
cols. Another coercion-resistant voting scheme was introduced – and proved – in [ARR+10a].
Several other papers proposed voting schemes which provably satisfy privacy as an intuitive argu-
ment for coercion-resistance, cf. e.g. [Rya10].
Putting coercion resistance in a broader economic or social context has been, to our best knowl-
edge, mostly left untouched. The only paper in this strand that we are aware of is [BM07]. The au-
thors compare two voting systems using game models, more precisely zero-sum two-player games
based on attack trees. There are two actions available for the attacker (performing the attack or
not), and the authority is presumably choosing one of the two voting systems. The utility of the
attacker is the expected probability of successful coercion minus the expected probability of being
caught. The value is computed for the two systems using empirical data. In contrast, we consider
a more general game where coercion – and resistance measures – come at a cost (instead of simply
assuming probability distributions for the possible events), and we look for the rational choices of
the players using game-theoretic solution concepts. We also argue that the coercion game is not
zero-sum, with important consequences for the best policy to be chosen.
4.2 Modeling Coercions in Elections: Complete Information
Setting
We model the election as a game in normal form. In the general case, we may have several coercers
who try to change the result of election in different ways. But in the models we use in this chapter,
we consider that there is only one coercer acting in the election. We consider that the election
includes a set of candidates Ω = {ω1, ...,ωg} and a set of n voters. However we don’t consider
candidates or voters as the players in the game model, but rather as parameters of the model.
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We model the election as a strategic game 〈{A,C},Σ,(uA,uC)〉, where Σ = ΣA×ΣC with the
following ingredients:
Players. A and C are the players in the game. The player A is an honest election authority who
acts on behalf of the society. We assume that the goal of this player is in line with what we may
call “the common good of the society”. Player A has no preference for any of the candidates and
tries to make the result of the election as similar as possible to the result of the election without
any coercion, i.e when the voters vote only on basis of their own preferences over the candidates.
Player C represent a potential coercer. This player may try to change the result of the election
by threatening or bribing voters in order to make them vote based on the coercer’s plan, rather than
the voters’ own preferences over the candidates.
Note that we do not represent the voters explicitly as players in the game. Their interests are
globally represented by the preferences of A.
Actions and strategies. ΣA = {α0, ...,αMax} is the set of privacy methods available to be imple-
mented by the election authority A. These represent the security measures that are possible to be
implemented in order to prevent, or make it harder, for a coercer to find out about the actual value
of the votes of the voters. It is assumed that α0 represents the case of no privacy.
ΣC = {0, ...,n∗, ...,n} is the set of actions for the coercer C. The actions of the coercer are the
number of voters the coercer attempts to bribe. So action t shows the action of attempting to bribe
t voters by the coercer. The minimum number of voters that the coercer needs to bribe in order to
change the result of the election in its favour is n∗, where 0 ≤ n∗ ≤ n (where n is the number of
voters). It is assumed that coercing more than n∗ voters always only add the cost of coercion for
the coercer and is always dominated for the coercer by n∗. Therefore, when analysing the model,
if we assume that the coercer knows the value of n∗, we normally don’t consider the actions n∗+1
to n.
Preferences. Preferences are represented by utility functions over possible combinations of strate-
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gies. For each player, their utility combines several factors. The utility if the election authority A
is defined as uA(σ) = vA(out(σ))− imp(α j), where:
• σ = (α j,k) ∈ Σ is an action profile, chosen by the players in the game.
• out : Σ→ Ω gives the result of the election. We assume that the result of the election is
depends only on the actions chosen by the players in the game.
• imp : ΣA→R is the implementation cost function. imp(α j) shows the cost of implementing
the privacy method α j for the player A. It is assumed that imp(α0) = 0, and imp(αt) ≤
imp(αt ′) if t < t ′.
• vA :Ω→R is a function that gives the value of the election for the player A. Our assumption
is that for all α j, vA(out(α j,k1)) ≤ vA(out(α j,k2)) if k1 < k2. It means that adding a new
bribed voter can only decrease the value of the election for player A. The function vA is
defined such that it can take only two values: for a given σ either vA(out(σ)) = v∗A, when
the result of the election is the same as its result without coercion, or vA(out(σ)) = v∗A− εA,
when the result of election has changed because of coercion, where εA is a positive number.
We assume the value εA is larger than implementation cost of any privacy method: for all
αi ∈ ΣA, imp(αi)< εA.
The utility function for the coercer C is defined as uC(σ) = vC(out(σ))− k× (dC(α j)+βC),
where:
• σ = (α j,k) ∈ Σ is an action profile, chosen by the players in the game, where α j is the
security measure chosen by player A and k is the number of voters that coercer attepmts to
coerce.
• out : Σ→Ω gives the result of the election, given an action profile.
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• vC :Ω→R is a function that gives the value of the election for the player C. The function vC
is defined such that it can take only two values: for a given σ either vC(out(σ)) = v∗C, when
the result of the election is in favor of the coercer, or vC(out(σ)) = v∗C− εC, when the result
of the election is not in favor of the coercer, where εC is a positive number.
• βC is the cost of bribing one voter for the player C. It is assumed that this number is constant
for any number of bribed voters and for all the privacy methods used.
• dC :ΣA→R is a difficulty function of the security method, such that dC(α j) shows the cost of
verifying the vote of one voter by the coercer, when the privacy method α j is implemented.
It is assumed that dC(α0) = 0, and dC(αt)≤ d(αt ′) if t < t ′.
We sometimes write costC(α j) instead of the value dC(α j)+βC(α j). It represents the total
cost that the coercer must pay for successfuly coercing one voter, which consists of both the
bribing cost, and the cost of overcoming the security measure.
• k is the number of voters that player C attempts to coerce.
In the following, first we consider a strategic game model with complete information, and we
distinguish two possible settings: in one setting there exists a perfect security measure available
for A, and in the other one player A can increase the cost of breaking the privacy but it cannot
rule out the possibility of breaking it completely. Then we consider a strategic game model with
incomplete information, where both the authority A and the coercer C have uncertainty about the
value of n∗ (the number of voters needed to be coerced by the coercer so that the result of election
changes).
4.2.1 Perfect Security Measure
The first case that we study is the situation where the election authority has a choice between no
security measure and a perfect security measure. In this case ΣA = {α0,α1}, where α0 represents
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0 n∗
α0 (v∗A , v
∗
C− εC) (v∗A− εA , v∗C−βC ·n∗)
α1 (v∗A− imp(α1),v∗C− εC) (v∗A− imp(α1) , v∗C− εC−βC ·n∗)
Figure 4.1 Game model for perfect privacy. The Stackelberg equilibrium for the authority
is shown in bold. There is no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
no privacy and α1 represents perfect security measure.
α1, being a perfect security measure, implies that the coercer cannot change the result of the
election no matter how many voters he attempts to bribe, as there is no way for him to verify the
values of the votes. Therefore in this case the utility of the coercer would be v∗C − εC − k · βC,
where k is the number of voters he attempts to bribe. Notice that we assume a coercion attempt is
successful only if the coercer can verify the votes. Also we assume that when the security measure
is perfect, there will be no difficulty cost for the coercer, but the result of election won’t change no
matter how many voters are attempted to be coerced.
We consider that n∗, the exact number of voters that the coercer needs to coerce in order to
change the result of the election in his favour, is known to both the coercer and the authority.
Because for player C the actions 1 to n∗−1 are all dominated by action 0, we remove them from
the game table. Therefore the only actions considered for the coercer are 0 and n∗. The game table
of this game is depicted in Figure 4.1. For each action of the player A we show the best response
of player C in red, and respectively for each action of C show the best response of player A in blue.
This game has no pure Nash equilibrium. In its mixed Nash equilibrium the authority chooses
"no privacy" with the probability p = βC·n
∗
εC , and the coercer attempts to coerce the voters with the
probability q = imp(α1)εA . In this case the expected utility of the authority is v
∗
A− imp(α1), which
is also its utility at its maximin strategy which is α1. Therefore the authority can as well always
choose α1. In this scenario, the Stackelberg equilibrium for the authority coincides with its maxmin
strategy, so the authority does not gain by making its strategy public and committing to it. On the
other hand if we consider that the authority would prefer no coercion attempt over an unsuccessful
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coercion attempt (this can be modeled by adding−k ·βA to the utility of the player A, where k is the
number of bribed voters and βA is some small positive number), then the Stackelberg equilibrium
does not coincide with maxmin (because v∗A− imp(α1) > v∗A− imp(α1)− n∗ · βA). Thus, A can,
in fact, improve its utility by bringing the game to a Stackelberg equilibrium. It can do that by
making its commitment to choose α1 public. As a result, the coercer not anymore preferring to
attempt to coerce changes its choice from mixing between b0 and bn∗ , to not to coerce at all.
4.2.2 Imperfect Privacy
The next case we study is where the election authority has several choices for the privacy method,
such that none of them is perfect. In other words, under all the security measures the coercer is
able to coerce successfully. Again we assume that the value of n∗ (the amount of voters needed
to be coerced to change the result of the election in favour of the coercer) is known to both the
coercer and the authority. The game model is 〈{A,C},Σ,(uA,uC)〉, in which Σ = ΣA× ΣC and
ΣA = {α0, ...,αMax}. As the authority changes the privacy method from α0 to αMax, the difficulty
of coercing for the coercer increases. For a given privacy method α , if v∗C− costC(α) ·n∗ is larger
than v∗C − εC then the coercer prefers coercing over not coercing. But it might be the case that
from some privacy method αm on, the cost of coercing for the coercer is more than εC. In this
case, the coercer, although being able to coerce successfully, prefers not to attempt to coerce the
election. We assume the coercer prefers to coerce when the privacy method is among α0 to αm−1,
and prefers not to coerce when the privacy method is among αm to αMax. In other words for
αi,m≤ i≤Max, we have (v∗C−εC)≥ (v∗C−costC(αi) ·n∗). For the similar reasons as the previous
case, the only actions considered for the coercer are 0 and n∗. The game table of this game for four
chosen security measures α0, αm∗−1, αm∗ and αMax is depicted in Figure 4.2. For each action of
the player A we show the best response of player C in red, and respectively for each action of C
show the best response of player A in blue.
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0 n∗
α0 (v∗A , v
∗
C− εC) (v∗A− εA , v∗C− costC(α0) ·n∗)
αm∗−1 (v∗A− imp(αm∗−1) , v∗C− εC) (v∗A− imp(αm∗−1)− εA , v∗C− costC(αm∗−1) ·n∗)
αm∗ (v∗A− imp(αm∗),v∗C− εC) (v∗A− imp(αm∗)− εA , v∗C− costC(αm∗) ·n∗)
αMax (v∗A− imp(αMax) , v∗C− εC) (v∗A− imp(αMax)− εA , v∗C− costC(αMax) ·n∗)
Figure 4.2 Game model for breakable privacy. The Nash equilibrium is at (α0,bn∗), and
the Stackelberg equilibrium for the authority is shown in bold.
This game has a pure Nash equilibrium at (α0,n∗). In this equilibrium, the coercer attempts co-
ercing enough voters, and the authority chooses the least safe privacy method among the possible
choices. This equilibrium obviously is not a preferred one for the authority. One approach for the
authority to change this equilibrium to a more preferred one is to use a Stackelberg equilibrium. If
the authority commits itself to choose the privacy method αm and makes this commitment public
(such that the coercer believes the commitment), then the coercer chooses 0 (not to attempt coerc-
ing any voter) because its utility would be lower if he attempts to coerce rather than not coercing.
By using the Stackelberg strategy, the authority improves its utility by εA− imp(αm). So if the
implementation cost of αm is lower than the cost of a successfully coerced election for the author-
ity, it can definitely benefit from changing the Nash equilibrium to the Stackelberg equilibrium by
making its commitment public. This result suggests that even if the authority chooses a privacy
method which is difficult enough to break, such that the coercers prefer not to attempt to coerce,
the authority cannot benefit from this choice unless it makes this decision public and makes the
coercers believe its commitment to choose the privacy method.
Like in the previous case, it is easy to see that Stackelberg is different from maxmin (the
maximin strategy of player A is α0 and its maximin value is v∗A− εA). Thus, again, the election
authority should publicly commit to its coercion-resistance strategy αm∗ .
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4.3 Modeling Coercions in Elections: Incomplete Information
Setting
In the previous scenarios, we assumed that players have complete information about the game.
This is not in general true, as players may not be certain about some aspects of the game they
are playing. For example, they may be uncertain about another player’s preference between some
of the outcomes, or even their own utility. In this section, we consider some scenarios involving
incomplete information of the players. Specifically, we consider that the players don’t know the
exact number of voters that the coercer need to coerce to change the result of the election in his
favour (This number is shown by n∗ in the models).
Although the incomplete information about the value of n∗ in the model represent the uncer-
tainty of players about the exact number voters to coerce, in the real world it can also represent the
uncertainty of players about some other parts of the system. For example, a coercer may have to
choose his targets blindly, without knowing their initial preferences. Therefore it is possible that he
attempts to coerce someone who initially was going to vote for his side regardless of the coercion.
This makes the coercer uncertain about how many voters exactly he needs to coerce in order to
have the needed amount of change of votes. So the effect of this "colliding" situations can also be
modelled as the incomplete information of the coercer on the number of voters he has to coerce.
Although the players don’t know the exact value of n∗, we assume that they have some beliefs
about this value. In particular, we assume that the players know the probability distribution the
value of n∗. Moreover, in the scenarios we discuss, we assume that both the coercer and the
authority have the same beliefs about the probability distribution of n∗. This assumption may not
be true in all the games of this kind, but in the election scenarios where these beliefs are based on
the polling results which are usually made public, it seems to be realistic.
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4.3.1 Bayesian Game Model
We model the incomplete information scenarion as a Bayesian game model 〈{A,C},Ω,Σ,T,τ, p,(uˆA, uˆC)〉,
with the following ingredients:
Players. A and C are the players in the game, similar to the previous scenarios.
States of the world. Ω is the set of states of the world. In our scenario, each state of the world
corresponds to one possible value for the n∗, the number of voters needed to be coerced so the
result of election changes in coercer’s favour.
Actions. Σ = ΣA×ΣC is the set of action profiles for the players, which is similar to the previous
scenarios. We assume that the set of possible actions for the players is the same in all states of the
world.
Player types. T = TA×TC is the set of type profiles of the players. We consider that TA = {tA}
and TC = {tC}. In other words, we consider that there is only one possible type for each player,
because in our scenarios players don’t have uncertainty about each other’s beliefs. Both players
consider the probability distribution of n∗ as common knowledge.
Signal function. τ = (τA,τC), where τA :Ω→ TA, and τC : Ω→ TC. The signal function assigns a
type to each player based on the actual state of nature. In our scenario the assigned type is always
the same for each player.
Probability distribution. p ∈ ∆(Ω) is the probability distribution over the states of nature as
believed by both players. Notice that in general, each player may assign a different probability
distribution over the states of nature, but in our scenarios, we assume this distribution is common
knowledge. Although the values of n∗ are discrete, when the number of voters is large we can
use continuous probability distributions to estimate the probability of it being in different ranges.
In this chapter, we will consider two probability distributions: uniform distribution and normal
distribution.
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Utility functions. uˆA, uˆC :Ω×Σ→R are utility functions of the players. They are defined similarly
to the ones in the complete information setting, with the difference that they depend not only on
the action profile chosen by the players, but also on the actual state of the nature.
For analysing the solution concepts of this Bayesian game, as we already saw in Chapter 3, we
can transform it into a normal form game. This transformation was introduced by Harsany [HS72].
In each of the following scenarios we transform the Bayesian game 〈{A,C},Ω,Σ,T,τ, p,(uˆA, uˆC)〉
into a normal form game 〈{A,C},Σ,(uA,uC)〉, such that for s ∈ Σ
uA(s) = Eω∈Ω[uˆA(ω,s)]
and
uC(s) = Eω∈Ω[uˆC(ω,s)]
4.3.2 Uniform Probability Distribution
In our first scenario with incomplete information, we consider that the players know that the value
of n∗ has uniform probability distribution in range [na,nb], where n ≥ b ≥ a ≥ 0. This may be a
very simplistic way to model the uncertainty of the players about n∗, but it can also reflect some
realistic situations. For example consider that the coercer doesn’t have any information about the
number of voters who support him in a majority based election, and the only information he has is
the number of voters. This situation can be modelled as the coercer believing that n∗ has a uniform
distribution between zero and half of the number of voters plus one.
In order to have normal form game transformation 〈{A,C},Σ,(uA,uC)〉, we need to compute
uA(α,n) and uC(α,n) for a security measure α chosen by player A and the number of voters n
chosen by the player C to coerce.
Utility of the coercer player. We consider three ranges for n and compute uC(α,n) in each range
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separately:
• If n < a then in all states of the nature n < n∗, therefore:
uC(α,n) = v∗C− εC−n · costC(α).
In this range the action 0 is the best response of player C. By choosing this action the utility
of the coercer is v∗C− εC.
• If n≥ b then in all states of the nature n≥ n∗, therefore:
uC(α,n) = v∗C−n · costC(α).
In this range the action b is the best respond of the player C, which corresponds to the utility
v∗C−b · costC(α) for the coercer.
• If a≤ n < b then
uC(α,n) = Eω∈Ω[uˆC(ω,(α,n))] = v∗C−n · costC(α)−
b−n
b−a · εC
= v∗C−
b
b−a · εC +n · (
εC
b−a − costC(α)).
If εCb−a − costC(α) is positive then uC(α,n) is increasing in n and otherwise it is decreasing
in n.
Utility of the authority player. For the utility of the authority uA(α,n), given a security measure
α chosen by player A and the number of voters n chosen by the player C to coerce, we again
consider three ranges:
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• If n < a then in all the states of the nature n < n∗, therefore:
uA(α,n) = v∗A− imp(α).
• If n≥ b then in all states of the nature n≥ n∗, therefore:
uA(α,n) = v∗A− imp(α)− εA.
• If a≤ n < b then
uA(α,n) = Eω∈Ω[uˆA(ω,(α,n))] = v∗A− imp(α)−
n−a
b−a · εA.
Normal form model. By observing the values of uC, we can see that in the range [0,a], and also
when n > b, uC(α,n) is decreasing in n. In the range [a,b], based on the sign of ( εCb−a − costC(α))
it can be increasing or decreasing in n. So the best response of the coercer is always one of the
actions 0 or b (action a is always dominated by 0). Therefore we need only to consider these
two actions for player C. We have that uC(α,0) = v∗C− εC and uC(α,b) = v∗C− b.costC(α). The
coercer profits more by coercing b voters when costC(α)< εCb , and otherwise would prefer to not
to coerce. We assume that from α0 to αm∗−1, it holds that costC(α)< εCb and from αm∗ on, it holds
that costC(α)> εCb .
Figure 4.3 shows the game table for the uniform distribution of n∗. The best responses of the
coercer for each choice of the authority is depicted in red, and the best response of the player A for
each choice of the coercer is depicted in blue. Similar to the scenario with complete information,
the game has a pure Nash equilibrium which is (α0,b). Again, as this is not a preferred equilib-
rium, the authority can use the Stackelberg equilibrium of the game, which is at (αm∗,0). As the
Stackelberg equilibrium is different from maxmin of player A (which is at (αm∗,b)), player A will
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0 b
α0 (v∗A , v
∗
C− εC) (v∗A− εA , v∗C−βC ·b)
αm∗−1 (v∗A− imp(αm∗−1) , v∗C− εC) (v∗A− imp(αm∗−1)− εA , v∗C−b · costC(αm∗−1))
αm∗ (v∗A− imp(αm∗),v∗C− εC) (v∗A− imp(αm∗)− εA , v∗C−b · costC(αm∗))
αMax (v∗A− imp(αMax) , v∗C− εC) (v∗A− imp(αMax)− εA , v∗C−b · costC(αMax))
Figure 4.3 Incomplete information game model, where the number of voters needed to
coerce is estimated by a uniform probability distribution. The Nash equilibrium is is at
(α0,bnµ+σ ), and the Stackelberg equilibrium for the authority is shown in bold.
need to commit to choosing the method αm and to make this commitment public.
4.3.3 Normal Probability Distribution
In our second scenario with incomplete information, we consider that the players know that the
value of n∗ has a normal probability distribution with mean value µ and standard deviation σ .
Considering a normal probability distribution for n∗ is usually more realistic than the uniform
distribution.
Again, for constructing the stategic game transformation 〈{A,C},Σ,(uA,uC)〉, we need to com-
pute uA(α,n) and uC(α,n) for a security measure α chosen by player A and the number of voters
n chosen by the player C to coerce.
Utility of the coercer player. When n∗ has a normal distribution with mean µ and standard
deviation σ , the probability of a chosen n being more than n∗ is:
Pr[n∗ ≤ n] = 1
2
[1+ er f (
n−µ
σ
√
2
)].
where:
er f (x) =
1√
pi
∫ x
−x
e−t
2 ·dt.
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Therefore uC(α,n) can be calculated as:
uC(α,n) = Eω∈Ω[uˆC(ω,(α,n))] = v∗C−n · costC(α)−
1
2
[1− er f (n−µ
σ
√
2
)] · εC
= v∗C−µ · costC(α)−
εC
2
+ γ(n).
where:
γ(n) =
εC
2
· er f (n−µ
σ
√
2
)− (n−µ) · costC(α).
Analysing the changes of function γ(n) shows that if costC(α)> εCσ√2 then γ(n) is decreasing in n.
In this case uc(α,n) has its maximum at n = 0. If costC(α)< εCσ√2 then γ(n), and hence uC(α,n),
has a maximum at
nmaxα = µ+
√
2σ2ln(
εC√
2pi · costC(α) ·σ
).
Notice that this number is decreasing in costC(α). We denote the value of uC(α,n) at this point by
umax,αC , where:
umax,αC = v
∗
C−nmaxα · costC(α)−
1
2
[1− er f (n
max
α −µ
σ
√
2
)] · εC
umax,αC is positive and is increasing in σ and decreasing in costC(α).
Utility of the authority player. If the coercer chooses to coerce n voters and the security measure
α is implemented, the utility of the authority in normal form transformation is:
uA(α,n) = v∗A− imp(α)−
1
2
[1+ er f (
n−µ
σ
√
2
)] · εA.
Notice that if we fix n, this function is decreasing in imp(α).
Normal form model. We can consider two cases: If costC(α) > εCσ√2 then the best response for
the coercer is 0, and otherwise his best response is nmaxα . We assume that from α0 to αm∗−1, it holds
that costC(α)< εCσ√2 and from αm∗ on, it holds that costC(α)>
εC
σ
√
2
.
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Figure 4.4 shows the strategic game model for the normal distribution of n∗. For the choices
of the authority, we have only shown four security measures: α0, αm∗−1, αm∗ and αMax. For the
choices of the coercer, we only included the ones that are the best responses to one of the depicted
choices of the authority. The choice 0 is the best response for the coercer when authority chooses
any security measure from αm∗ on. The choice nmax0 is the best response when authority chooses
α0, and the choice nmaxm∗−1 is the best response when authority’s choice is αm∗−1. For each choice of
the authority, the best response of the coercer is depicted in red, and for each choice of the coercer
the best response of the authority is shown in blue.
The game has a pure Nash equilibrium at (α0,nmax0 ), which clearly is not a good result for
the authority player. However, if the implementation cost of the security measure αm∗ is less
than the expected damage that player A gets from the coercion at the Nash equilibrium, i.e if
imp(αm∗)< 12 [1+er f (
nmax0 −µ
σ
√
2
)] ·εA, then the authority can use a Stackelberg equilibrium at (αm∗,0)
by committing itself to choose the method αm∗ and to make this commitment public.
Now consider that the authority cannot, or does not prefer to implement αm∗ or more secure
privacy methods (for example because of the high cost of it) and the strongest security measure
that can be implemented is a suboptimal security measure αm∗−1. By announcing his choice and
committing to it, the authority can achieve an equilibrium at (αm∗−1,nmaxm∗−1). In this equilibrium
the estimated cost of a successfully coerced election for the authority (12 [1+ er f (
n−nµ
σ
√
2
)] · εA) is
lower than ones in the pure Nash equilibrium of the game. If this reduction of cost is worthwhile
for the authority (in comparison to the extra implementation cost of αm∗−1 comparing to α0), the
authority can benefit from announcing and committing to his strategy even in a suboptimal security
measure.
Notice that by increasing the uncertainty about the number of needed votes to buy, i.e., by
increasing σ , the value of m∗ decreases. It means that the Stackelberg equilibrium can be moved
to a one with lower implementation cost for the authority. This may suggest that the authority can
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0 nmaxm∗−1 n
max
0
α0 (v∗A , v∗C− εC) (uA(α0,nmaxm∗−1) , uC(α0,nmaxm∗−1)) (uA(α0,nmax0 ) , umax,α0C )
αm∗−1 (v∗A− imp(αm∗−1) , v∗C− εC) (uA(αm∗−1,nmaxm∗−1) , umax,αm∗−1C ) (uA(αm∗−1,nmax0 ) , uC(αm∗−1,nmax0 ))
αm∗ (v∗A− imp(αm∗),v∗C− εC) (uA(αm∗ ,nmaxm∗−1) , uC(αm∗ ,nmaxm∗−1)) (uA(αm∗ ,nmax0 ) , uC(αm∗ ,nmax0 ))
αMax (v∗A− imp(αMax),v∗C− εC) (uA(αMax,nmaxm∗−1) , uC(αMax,nmaxm∗−1)) (uA(αMax,nmax0 ) , uC(αMax,nmax0 ))
Figure 4.4 Incomplete information game model, where the number of voters needed to
coerce is estimated by a normal probability distribution. The Nash equilibrium is is at
(α0,bnmax0 ), and the Stackelberg equilibrium for the authority is shown in bold.
in fact benefit from restrictions on making very accurate pollings be available to the public before
the election.
4.4 Summary
In this chapter, we looked at simple social models of coercion-resistance in voting procedures.
The models are two-person non-zero-sum noncooperative games, where one player represents the
society and the other a potential coercer in the election. The models are arguably extremely simple.
Still, even at this stage, some interesting patterns can be observed. Most importantly, we show that
in all games that we consider, Stackelberg equilibrium is different from Nash equilibrium. In other
words, it is in the interest of the society not to adapt to the expected strategy of the coercer. Rather,
the society should decide on its coercion-resistance policy in advance. Moreover, the Stackelberg
equilibrium does not coincide with maxmin, which suggests that the society will benefit from
announcing its policy openly. This way, the coercer is best off when refraining from coercion
altogether.
Chapter 5
Strategies and Information Flow:
Preliminaries
Information flow security is one of the methods used for preventing insecure information propa-
gation in systems. In the literature of information flow security, the term noninterference applies
to a class of formal security properties, with the intuition that an agent at a high-security level is
unable to interfere with an agent at a lower security level. The term was first introduced in the
seminal work by Goguen and Meseguer [GM82] as a formalisation of information flow security.
The concept can be informally described as follows: one group of users, using a certain set of
actions, is noninterfering with another group of users if what the first group does has no effect on
what the second group of users can see. The idea is to prevent any information about the behaviour
of the first group (which we call H players) to flow to the second group (which we call L players).
This chapter serves as a preliminary for Chapters 6 and 7, where we build our proposals around
the standard notion of noninterference by Goguen and Meseguer [GM82].
Outline of the chapter. In Section 5.1 first we have a brief literature review on noninterference and
its variants. Then we present the transition network model, similar to the one used in the original
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definition of noninterference in the seminal work of Goguen and Meseguer [GM82]. Subsequently,
in this section, we give a definition of standard noninterference using the transition network model.
We also present the unwinding relation as a characterisation for the noninterference property. Sec-
tion 5.2 contains the definition of the strategy of players in the transition network model. In Sec-
tion 5.3 we discuss how to define temporal goals of players and sure-winning strategies in this
model. Finally, Section 5.4 concludes this chapter.
5.1 Information Flow Security and Noninterference
From its appearance in [GM82], noninterference has been vastly used to define confidentiality
properties in programs and concurrent processes. Since then, several variations have been sug-
gested for the concept, such as nondeducibility [Sut86], noninference [O’H90], and restrictive-
ness [McC88]. Although noninterference was originally introduced for systems modelled as finite
state machines for formalising information security in operating systems verification, it was later
redefined, generalised, and extended in the framework of process algebras [All91, RWW94, Ros95,
RG99, RS01] to describe the security properties of concurrent processes. Noninterference and its
variants have been studied from different perspectives. Some works dealt with composability of
noninterference, e.g., in [McC88, ZL95, SS09]. Another group of papers studied the properties
of intransitive noninterference, e.g., in [RG99, BP03, vdM07, EvdMZ12]. Probabilistic nonin-
terference and quantitative noninterference have been investigated, e.g., in [GI90, WJ90, MM03,
PHW04, LZ05, Smi09].
We build our proposals in Chapers 6 and 7 around the standard notion of noninterference by
Goguen and Meseguer [18]. We use the transition network model, similar to the one in the work
of Goguen and Meseguer, to represent the interaction between actions of different agents and to
define the security properties. We have chosen this model as the basis for our proposals because it
5.1 Information Flow Security and Noninterference 48
is relatively easy to express game theoretic concepts such as the goals and the strategies of the play-
ers in it. Accordingly, defining security notions that are related to these game theoretical concepts
is more straightforward in the transition network models. However, we should also mention the
restrictions that these models bring about. Firstly, Goguen and Meseguer’s models define agents’
observations based on the states only, whereas it is sometimes more convenient to model the in-
formation flow due to directly observing each others’ actions. Secondly, The models are fully
asynchronous in the sense that if each user “submits” a sequence of actions to be executed then
every interleaving of the submitted sequences can occur as the resulting behaviour of the system.
No synchronisation is possible. Thirdly, the models are “total on input” (each action label is avail-
able to every user in every state), and hence no synchronisation mechanism can be encoded via the
availability of actions.
Especially the last two features imply that models of Goguen and Meseguer allow for represen-
tation of a very limited class of systems. More expressive classes of models include various kinds
of transition systems [WN95], concurrent programs [KVW00], interpreted systems [FHMV95], re-
active modules [AH99], multi-agent transition networks (a.k.a. concurrent game structures) [AHK02],
and many more.
5.1.1 Transition Network Model
Definition 5.1.1 (Transition network model). A multi-agent asynchronous transition network M
(which from now on we simply call a transition network) is a tuple 〈St,s0,U,A,Obs,obs,do〉where:
• St is the set of states,
• s0 is the initial state,
• U is the set of agents (or users),
• A is the set of actions (or commands),
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s0 s1
(H, push)
(H, push)
(L, push)
(L, push)
obs(s0,H) = o f f
obs(s0,L) = o f f
obs(s1,H) = on
obs(s1,L) = on
Figure 5.1 A simple transition network model for the scenario of Example 5.1.1
• Obs is the set of possible observations (or outputs);
• obs : St×U→ Obs is the observation function.
• do : St ×U×A ⇀ St is the transition function that specifies the (deterministic) outcome
do(s,u,a) of action a if it is executed by user u in state s.
We will sometimes write [s]u instead of obs(s,u). We will call a pair (user, action) a personal-
ized action.
We construct the multi-step transition function exec : St× (U×A)∗ ⇀ St so that, for a finite
string α ∈ (U×A)∗ of personalized actions, exec(s,α) denotes the state resulting from execution
of α from s on. We may sometimes write s α−→ t instead of exec(s,α) = t, and exec(α) instead of
exec(s0,α).
In this chapter and throughout Chapters 6 and 7, wherever we refer to H players and L players,
unless explicitly stated otherwise, we assume that H and L are disjoint and partition U.
Example 5.1.1. Consider an engine with a very simple push down button for turning it on or off.
The button has a sensor to distinguish between the H and the L players. The H player can turn the
engine on or off by pushing the button. The L player though, can only turn the engine off. If L player
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pushes the button while the engine is off, the state of the engine does not change. We can model this
scenario as a transition network M = 〈St,s0,U,A,Obs,obs,do〉 where St = {s0,s1}, U = {H,L},
A = {push}, do(s0,H, push) = s1, do(s1,H, push) = s0, do(s0,L, push) = s0, do(s1,L, push) =
s0, Obs = {on,o f f}, obs(s0,H) = o f f , obs(s1,H) = on, obs(s0,L) = o f f , and obs(s1,L) = on.
Figure 5.1 shows this transition network.
Definition 5.1.2 (Purge function). If U ⊆U, A⊆A, and α ∈ (U×A)∗, then by PurgeU(α) we mean
the subsequence of α obtained by eliminating all the pairs (u,a) with u ∈U. Also PurgeU,A(α)
denotes the subsequence of α obtained by eliminating all the pairs (u,a) with u ∈U and a ∈ A.
In general, in a transition network model a state can be reached after different sequences of
personalised actions. So the current state of the model cannot tell exactly what has happened so
far. That’s why sometimes it is easier to study the behaviour of the agents using the tree unfolding
of a transition network model because in a tree unfolding of a transition network two different
histories of personalised actions always result in different nodes of the tree.
Definition 5.1.3 (Tree unfolding). If M = 〈St,s0,U,A,Obs,obs,do〉 is a transition network, the
tree unfolding of M is a transition network T (M) = 〈S′,s′0,U,A,Obs′,obs′,do′〉, and is defined as
follows:
• S′ ⊆ St+,
• s′0 = 〈s0〉,
• if s
(u,a)−−−→ s¯ and 〈s0s1 . . .sm = s〉 ∈ S′ , then 〈s0s1 . . .sms¯〉 ∈ S′ and 〈s0s1 . . .sm〉 (u,a)−−−→
〈s0s1 . . .sms¯〉, moreover do′ contains no other transitions than the ones defined this way.
• Obs′ = Obs+,
• obs(u,〈s′0〉) = 〈obs(u,s0)〉,
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............ ... ... ... ...
(H, push) (L, push)
(H, push) (L, push) (H, push) (L, push)
〈s0〉
〈s0,s1〉 〈s0,s0〉
〈s0,s1,s0〉 〈s0,s0,s1〉
Figure 5.2 Tree unfolding of the transition network of Figure 5.1. The observations are
not depicted in the picture.
• if h= 〈s0s1 . . .sm〉 , then obs′(u,h◦q) = obs′(u,h) if obs(u,sm) = obs(u,q) , and obs(u,h◦
q) = obs′(h)◦obs(u,q) otherwise.
Example 5.1.2. The tree unfolding of the transition network of the scenario of the Example 5.1.1
is shown in Figure 5.2 (the observations of the players are not depicted in the picture).
5.1.2 Modelling Noninterference Using the Transition Network Model
We first recall the standard notion of noninterference by Goguen and Meseguer [GM82] and then
discuss some remarks about the concept.
Definition 5.1.4 (Noninterference [GM82]). Given a transition network M and sets of agents H
and L, we say that H is non-interfering with L iff for all α ∈ (U×A)∗ and all ul ∈ L we have
[exec(α)]ul = [exec(PurgeH(α))]ul . We denote the property by NIM(H,L).
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In other words, for every sequence of actions αH that H can execute, there is no “response”
sequence from L which, interleaved with αH , might reveal that H have done anything. Assuming
that H need to hide only occurrences of some “sensitive” actions A ⊆ A, the concept of noninter-
ference is refined as follows.
Definition 5.1.5 (Noninterference on sensitive actions [GM82]). Given a transition network M,
sets of agents H,L, and a set of actions A ⊆ A, we say that H is non-interfering with L on A iff
for all α ∈ (U×A)∗ and all ul ∈ L we have [exec(α)]ul = [exec(PurgeH,A(α))]ul . We denote the
property by NIM(H,L,A).
It is easy to see that NIM(H,L) iff NIM(H,L,A).
Two remarks are in order. First, noninterference focuses solely on the information flow in the
system. If L can detect any activity of H then noninterference is lost, regardless of the nature of
the activity and the possible uses of the information. In real systems, the impact of information
flow goes well beyond the information itself. Information is sought and preserved for a reason, not
for its sake. Typically, L want to obtain information about H because they want to use it to achieve
their goals more effectively (i.e., conclude a business contract, submit a better bid in an auction,
get unauthorised access to a bank account, etc.). On the other hand, H want to protect their private
information from L because their goals may be in conflict with the goals of L. This is especially
the case when the Low players are labelled as “attackers” or “intruders”.
Secondly, detecting H’s actions may require L to engage in “diagnostic” activity, i.e., executing
a sequence of actions whose only purpose is to determine if H was active or not. This becomes
an issue when we see information as a resource used to obtain one’s goals, rather than the goal of
the user’s activity. Then, gathering more information about H can be in conflict with what L must
do in order to achieve their real goals. Thus, on one hand, L need more information to construct
a better strategy for their goals, but on the other hand to acquire the information they may have to
depart from the successful strategy.
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5.1.3 Unwinding Relation for the Noninterference Property
Noninterference is typically characterised by the unwinding relations [GM84, Rus92, vdMZ10].
Intuitively, an unwinding relation connects states that are indistinguishable to the L agents, in the
sense that L have no “diagnostic procedure” that would distinguish one from the other. Thus,
if H proceed from one such state to another, no information leaks to the adversaries. Unwinding
relations are important because they characterise noninterference in purely structural terms, similar
to well-known bisimulation relations. Moreover, the existence of an unwinding relation is usually
easier to verify than proving noninterference directly.
Definition 5.1.6 (Unwinding for Noninterference [GM84, Rus92]). Let M be a transition network,
H a set of High agents, and L a set of Low agents. Then, ∼NIL ⊆ St×St is an unwinding relation iff
it is an equivalence relation satisfying the conditions of output consistency (OC), step consistency
(SC), and local respect (LR). That is, for all states s, t ∈ St:
(OC) If s∼NILt then [s]L = [t]L;
(SC) If s∼NILt, u ∈ L, and a ∈ A then do(s,u,a)∼NILdo(t,u,a);
(LR) If u ∈ H and a ∈ A then s∼NILdo(s,u,a).
Proposition 5.1.1 ([GM84, Rus92]). NIM(H,L) iff there exist an unwinding relation ∼NIL on the
states of M that satisfies (OC), (SC) and (LR).
5.2 Defining Strategies of Players
Strategy is a game-theoretic concept which captures behavioral policies that an agent can con-
sciously follow in order to realize some objective [vNM44, LBS08]. We begin with an abstract
formulation and then mention the most representative examples of strategy types. Let T (M) be
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(H, push) (L, push)
(H, push) (L, push) (H, push) (L, push)
〈s0〉
〈s0,s1〉 〈s0,s0〉
〈s0,s1,s0〉 〈s0,s0,s1〉
Figure 5.3 The subtree shown in blue corresponds to the strategy of H player in Ex-
ample 5.2.1. It indicates the strategy of H never pushing the button when the engine is
on.
the tree unfolding of M. Also if U ⊆ U is a subset of agents, let T ′ be a U-trimming of tree T iff
T ′ is a subtree of T starting from the same root and obtained by removing an arbitrary subset of
transitions labeled by actions of agents from U . For the moment, we assume that each subset of
agents U ⊆ U is assigned a set of available coalitional strategies ΣU . The most important feature
of a strategy σU ∈ ΣU is that it constrains the possible behaviours of the system. We represent it
formally by the outcome function outM(σU) that removes the executions of the system that strategy
σU would never choose. Therefore, for every σU ∈ ΣU , its outcome outM(σU) is a U-trimming of
T (M). We may use nodes(outM(σU)) both to represent the states of outM(σU), or to represent the
states of M that are the last element in the states of outM(σU).
Let h be a node in tree T corresponding to a particular finite history of interaction. We
denote the sequence of personalised actions leading to h by act∗(h). Furthermore, act∗(T ) =
{act∗(h) | h ∈ nodes(T )} is the set of finite sequences of personalised actions that can occur in T .
5.2 Defining Strategies of Players 55
Example 5.2.1. In the scenario of Example 5.1.1, consider H player chooses the strategy of never
pushing the push button when the engine is on. The subtree corresponding to this strategy is
depicted in blue in Figure 5.3.
Positional and perfect recall strategies. Strategies are usually constructed as mappings from
possible situations that the player can recognise in the game, to actions of the player (or subsets
of actions if we allow for nondeterministic strategies). Two types of such strategies are commonly
used in the literature on game-like interaction: positional strategies and perfect recall strategies.
Positional strategies represent conditional plans where the decision is solely based on what the
agents see in the current state of the system. Formally, for u ∈ U, the set of individual positional
strategies of u is
ΣPosu = {σu : St→P(A) | ∀q,q′ ∈ St · [q]u = [q′]u⇒ σu(q) = σu(q′)},
where P(X) denotes the powerset of X . Notice the “uniformity” constraint which enforces that
the agent must specify the same action(s) in states with the same observations. Now, coalitional
positional strategies for a group of agents U ⊆ U are simply tuples of individual strategies, i.e.,
ΣPosU = ×u∈U(ΣPosu ). The outcome of σU ∈ ΣPosU in model M is the tree obtained from T (M) by
removing all the branches that begin from a node containing state q with a personalised action
(u,a) ∈U×A such that a /∈ σU(q).
Perfect recall strategies capture conditional plans where the agents can base their decisions on
the whole history of the game until that moment. Formally, the set of perfect recall strategies of
agent u is
ΣRecu = {σu : nodes(T (M))→P(A) | obsu(h) = obsu(h′)⇒ σu(h) = σu(h′)},
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where obsu(.) denotes the observation function of T (M) as defined in Definition 5.1.3. That is,
what u has learned along h is equivalent to the sequence of observations she has seen, modulo
removal of “stuttering” observations. Again, coalitional strategies of perfect recall for a group of
agents U ⊆ U are combinations of individual strategies, i.e., ΣRecU =×u∈U(ΣRecu ). The outcome of
σU ∈ ΣRecU in model M is the tree obtained from T (M) by removing all the branches that begin
from a node h with a personalised action (u,a) ∈U×A such that a /∈ σU(h).
5.3 Temporal Goals and Winning Strategies
A goal is a property that some agents may attempt to enforce by selecting their behaviour accord-
ingly. In game-theoretic models, goals are typically phrased as properties of the final state in the
game. In our case, there is no final state – the interaction can in principle go forever. Because
of that, we understand goals as properties of the full temporal trace that executes the sequence of
actions selected by users. We base our approach on the concepts of paths and path properties,
used in temporal specification and verification of systems [B6¨2, McN66]. Let paths(M) denote
the set of infinite sequences of states that can be obtained by subsequent transitions in M. Note
that every sequence of states in paths(M) corresponds to a sequence of states in paths(T (M)) and
vice versa. Therefore we may sometimes abuse the notation paths(T (M)) to represent paths(M).
Consequently, we will use pathsM(σ) as a shorthand for paths(outM(σ)) to represent the set of
infinite sequences of states in M that corresponds to the sequences of states in outM(σ).
Definition 5.3.1 (Temporal goal [McN66]). A goal in M is any Γ ⊆ paths(M). A goal can be
equivalently seen as a subset of paths in the tree unfolding of M.
Most common examples of such goals are safety and reachability goals.
Definition 5.3.2 (Safety and reachability goals [McN66]). Given a set of safe states S ⊆ St, the
safety goal ΓS is defined as ΓS = {λ ∈ paths(M) | ∀i.λ [i] ∈ S}. Moreover, given a set of target
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states T⊆ St, the reachability goal ΓT can be defined as ΓT = {λ ∈ paths(M) | ∃i.λ [i] ∈ T}.
Often, agents select their behavior in order to achieve their goal. However, it is not always
possible for an agent to ensure its goal regardless of the actions selected by the other agents. If
an agent (or a coalition of agents) have the ability to ensure a goal, we say that they have a surely
winning strategy to achieve that goal.
Definition 5.3.3 (Winning strategies). Given a transition network M, a set of agents U ⊆ U with
goal ΓU , and a set of strategies ΣRecU , we say that U have a (surely winning) strategy to achieve ΓU
iff there exists a strategy σU ∈ ΣRecU such that pathsM(σU)⊆ ΓU .
Notice that here we defined winning strategies, considering perfect recall for the agents. We
could alternatively consider positional strategies to use in the definition. In the following chapters
we use this definition unless it is explicitly stated otherwise.
5.4 Summary
In this chapter we presented the noninterference property and its formal definition using the transi-
tion network model. We then gave definitions of positional and perfect recall strategies of players.
Temporal goals such as safety goals and teachability goals were also defined in this model. We
then showed the definition of the winning strategies of the players regarding some temporal goals.
These definitions are mainly used in Chapters 6 and 7 which contains our contributions towards
Objective 2.a and 2.b of the thesis.
Chapter 6
Strategic Noninterference
As much as the notion of noninterference as an information flow security property is appealing
in theory, several challenges make it less useful in practice. Noninterference is a very restrictive
concept, and implementing a practical system that satisfies it entirely is hard or even impossible.
It becomes even more difficult when integrating an already deployed infrastructure with an infor-
mation flow policy defined on top of it (cf. [Zda04]). Last but not least, in many applications,
a downward flow of information is either permitted or is inevitable in some possible runs of the
system. In this chapter, we propose to restrict the property of noninterference to only a subset of
possible behaviours of the system. This leads to defining the strategic noninterference which is a
weaker notion of noninterference.
Outline of the chapter. In Section 6.1 we explain the motivating idea for our proposed strategic
noninterference property. Section 6.2 gives an overview of related works. Section 6.3 presents
the formal definition of strategic noninterference. Then in Section 6.4 we distinguish between the
two case where the strategy of high players is public versus where it is private. In Section 6.5 we
discuss the characterization of strategic noninterference in the form of unwinding relation. Finally,
in Section 6.6 we give a summary of the chapter.
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6.1 Motivation
The proposal follows an observation that, in most systems, not all possible behaviours actually
happen. If the High players pursue a particular goal, they may do so by executing a strategy. Then,
only those runs of the system can occur which are consistent with the strategy. But in that case,
it should suffice to preserve confidentiality only in the runs that can happen when the strategy is
executed. In other words, High do not need to worry about the leakage of information that their
strategy prevents.
For sophisticated systems, different security strategies are available that constrain the behaviour
of the system. Such a strategy can consist of implementation guidelines for programs, fixing some
parameters of the software (e.g., the schedule of automated updates, time windows for entering
new data, etc.), institutional policies in organisations, as well as imposing constraints on the be-
haviour of human components (e.g., who is allowed to enter new data). We propose that security
of the system can be seen as an interplay between the goal of the system, phrased in terms of a
functionality requirement, and the security strategy being used. The scenario of Example 6.1.1
shows how one may ensure noninterference in an intrinsically insecure system, by committing to
a strategy which both satisfies the desired goal and prevents information flow.
Example 6.1.1 (Motivating Example). Consider the following scenario: A health care system is
responsible for gathering medical data from the hospitals in the area and storing them on the
servers of the centre. The centre also provides limited internet access for public users who can run
allowed queries on the database. The querying interface is accessible all of the time. Moreover,
the data centre runs an updating procedure whenever new data is available at one of the hospitals.
To ensure the integrity of the answers, the querying interface returns “out of service” while the
update is running.
Unfortunately, it has turned out that a user may be able to relate the time of the update (= the
time of observing the “out of service” message) to the hospital from which the data comes. He
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may then gain unauthorised information about the hospital by checking the results of the queries
before and after the update.
The data centre provides multiple functionalities (storing, updating, and providing access to
the data). Moreover, requirements on the functionalities can be specified differently. An important
observation is that depending on the actual functionality requirement, there might exist a strategy
that fulfils the requirement and satisfies a given security property (in our case, noninterference).
Consider, for instance, the following condition: “the system should be updated as soon as new data
is available, and the querying interface should be running all day”. It is easy to see that, for this
functionality requirement, the system is bound to be vulnerable. More formally, no strategy satisfies
the requirement and at the same time guarantees noninterference. However, if the functionality
requirement is changed to a weaker one: “the system should be updated at most 24 hours after
new data is available, and the querying interface should be running at least 22 hours a day”, then
such a strategy exists. The strategy can be closing the interface for one hour every day, and
postponing the updates to the nearest closing time of the interface.
6.2 Related Works
A short literature review on the noninterference properties can be found in Section 5.1. Out of
all the works, only [RS01] comes closer to our proposal, as the authors suggest that, for systems
that do not satisfy noninterference in general, the property can be possibly restored for a suitably
constrained version of the system. However, the behavioural constraint has to be given explicitly,
and it can be of an entirely abstract nature. In particular, it does not have to specify an executable
strategy for any participants. Moreover, the functionality-related side (i.e., goals) is not treated
explicitly in [RS01].
When reasoning about information leakage, it is important to distinguish between two method-
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ological views on confidentiality. According to the first view, the Low users may attempt to read
directly or deduce indirectly information that they are not authorised to obtain, and they are trying
to do this on their own. The second view assumes possible cooperating agents among the High
players, for example, malicious spy processes, that help the Low players to get the unauthorised
information. This is usually done through covert channels [Lam73, WJ90]. In our approach, we
assume that either the High players are not malicious, or the commitment mechanism is powerful
enough so that even malicious players follow the selected strategy. We should also mention that
our proposal is inherently different from nondeducibility on strategies [WJ90]. While in [WJ90]
strategies are considered as a means to transfer information from the High player to the Low player,
in our approach it is used by the High player to prevent the leakage of information.
6.3 Strategic Noninterference: Definition
Our main idea can be summarised as follows. If the High agents H are going to behave in a certain
way, they do not need to worry about information leakage in all executions of the system but only
in those executions that can happen. In particular, if H execute strategy σH then they should not
care about the traces that are outside the outcome traces of σH . Moreover, the agents can choose σH
in such a way that they avoid leaks. This leads to the following attempt at refining noninterference
for agents who play strategically.
Definition 6.3.1 (Strategic Noninterference, first attempt). Given a transition network M, a set of
High agents H with coalitional strategies ΣH , a set of Low agents L, and a set of “sensitive” actions
A, we say that H is strategically non-interfering with L on A iff there exists a strategy σH ∈ ΣH such
that for all α ∈ act∗(outM(σH)) and all ul ∈ L we have [exec(α)]ul = [exec(PurgeH,A(α))]ul .
Unfortunately, the above definition is not very practical. True, in many cases the High agents
could avoid leakage of information – for instance, by refraining from doing anything but the most
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Figure 6.1 Transition network for the healthcare example. Reflexive arrows for transitions
that do not change the state of the system are omitted from the picture
conservative actions. In that case, however, they would never obtain what they want. Thus, we
need to take into account the goals of H in the definition of noninterference.
We can now propose a weaker concept of noninterference, parameterised with the goal that the
High agents pursue.
Definition 6.3.2 (Strategic Noninterference). Given a transition network M, a set of High agents H
with goal ΓH and coalitional strategies ΣH , a set of Low agents L, and a set of “sensitive” actions
A, we say that H is strategically non-interfering with L on actions A for goal ΓH iff there exists
a strategy σH ∈ ΣH such that: (i) pathsM(σH) ⊆ ΓH , and (ii) for every α ∈ act∗(outM(σH)) and
ul ∈ L we have [exec(α)]ul = [exec(PurgeH,A(α))]ul .
We will denote the property by SNIM(H,L,A,ΓH).
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Example 6.3.1 (Strategic noninterference). Consider the model in Figure 6.1 for the health care
scenario from Example 6.1.1. There are two agents H and L, and the initial state is s0. The possible
observations for agent H are updated and outdated, showing if the data centre is up-to-date or
not. The possible observations for agent L are on and off , showing if L sees the working interface
or the “out of service" message. The available actions are: newData used by H to signal that new
data is available from a hospital, startUpdate used by H to start the updating process, endUpdate
used by H to finish the process, openInt and closeInt used by H to open and close the interface,
and query used by L to run a query.
Let A = {newData,startUpdate,endUpdate}. Clearly, it is not the case that H noninterferes
with L on A, because PurgeH,A(〈(H,newData),(H,startUpdate)〉= 〈〉, but [s2]L 6= [s0]L. However,
if the goal ΓH is defined as the system being updated after any opening of the interface, then player
H can obtain ΓH by avoiding action startUpdate in state s1 and avoiding openInt in s4. For this
strategy, H’s behaviour is noninterfering with L on A. 
Note that the variant of strategic noninterference from Definition 6.3.1 is captured by
SNIM(H,L,A, paths(M)). Moreover, the following is straightforward:
Proposition 6.3.1. SNIM(H,L,A,ΓH) if and only if there exists σH ∈ ΣH such that pathsM(σH)⊆
ΓH and NIoutM(σH)(H,L,A).
6.4 Private vs. Public Strategies
According to Definition 6.3.2, L can only use what they observe to determine if H have done a
sensitive move. We implicitly assume that L do not know the strategy being executed by H; in
this sense, the strategy of H is private. Another possibility is to assume that L are aware of the
strategy of H. Then, L can detect in two ways that an action of H has occurred: (i) by getting to
an observation that could not be obtained without an interleaved action from H, or (ii) by passing
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through a state where H’s strategy forces H to execute something. In the model we use, where
the system is asynchronous and total on actions for all players, the condition (ii) can only happen
if the strategy of H includes some restriction on some of its non-sensitive actions. In this situation,
those actions become information-revealing if the L player knows the strategy of H.
It is often appropriate to assume that H’s strategy is known to the adversaries. This can be
adopted as a worst case assumption, e.g., when a long-term pattern of H’s behaviour is used by L
to predict their future strategy. A similar situation arises when H’s goals (or incentives) are easy
to guess. It is also known that announcing a strategy publicly and committing to it can sometimes
increase security, especially in case of a government agency (cf. e.g. [KYK+11], or Chapter 4 of
this thesis).
Definition 6.4.1 (Strategic Noninterference in Public Strategies). Given a transition network M, a
set of High agents H with goal ΓH and coalitional strategies ΣH , a set of Low agents L, and a set
of “sensitive” actions A ⊆ A, we say that H is strategically non-interfering with L on A for goal
ΓH in public strategies iff there exists a strategy σH ∈ ΣH such that: (i) pathsM(σH)⊆ ΓH , and (ii)
for every α ∈ act∗(outM(σH)) and ul ∈ L we have that [exec(α)]ul = [exec(PurgeH,A(α))]ul and
PurgeH,A(α) ∈ act∗(outM(σH)).
We will denote the property by SNI-PubM(H,L,A,ΓH).
Example 6.4.1 (Public vs. private strategies). Consider the transition system in Figure 6.2, with
two agents H and L and the initial state s0. The set of possible actions is A = {a,b,c,d} and the
set of sensitive actions is A = {c,d}. The observations for both agents are shown in the picture.
Let goal ΓH be that whenever system goes to s3, it must have been at some previous point in
s2. Agent H can obtain this goal by using strategy σ1 of avoiding action b in s0 and avoiding
action a in s1. Moreover, when using σ1, H noninterferes with L on A in private strategies but
not in public strategies. To see why, note that if α = 〈(H,c)(H,b)〉 then α ∈ act∗(out(σ1)) but
PurgeH,A(α) = 〈(H,b)〉 is not in act∗(out(σ1)). Therefore, although H can obtain ΓH by using
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Figure 6.2 Noninterference in public and private strategies
strategy σ1 while preserving noninterference, the security can be only achieved if L does not know
the strategy of H.
Now consider goal Γ′H being that whenever the system is at s0 or s1, the state changes in the
next step if an action from H gets executed. H can obtain this goal by using strategy σ2 of avoiding
action d in s0 and avoiding action c in s1. Using σ2, H noninterferes with L on A. Moreover, the
system satisfies noninterference in public strategies, so the agent H may let the agent L know his
strategy σ2 without compromising noninterference. 
Strategic noninterference is a weaker notion than ordinary noninterference. Out of the two
notions of SNI, noninterference in public strategies is stronger.
Proposition 6.4.1. NIM(H,L,A) ⇒ SNI-PubM(H,L,A,ΓH) ⇒ SNI(H,L,A,ΓH). The converse
implications do not universally hold.
Proof. The implications are straightforward from the definitions. Non-validity of the converse
implications follows from Examples 6.3.1 and 6.4.1.
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Models of Goguen and Meseguer allow only to represent systems that are fully asynchronous
and where all actions are available to each user in each state. As it turns out, revealing H’s strategy
makes a difference only when H have both sensitive and insensitive actions. Thus, if H are to
conceal all their actions then it actually doesn’t matter whether their strategy is publicly known.
Before showing this formally, we make the following observations.
Observation 6.4.2. In a transition network M, if u ∈ U, σH ∈ ΣH , and u /∈ H then for all α ∈
act∗(outM(σH)) and a ∈ A we have that α ◦ (u,a) ∈ act∗(outM(σH)), where α ◦ (u,a) denotes
concatenation of α and (u,a). This is because M is asynchronous and in each state any agents
may get its action executed before the others. On the other hand, σH only restricts the behaviour
of agents in H. Therefore any outgoing transition from a node in T (M) by an agent outside H must
remain in the trimmed tree given by outM(σH).
Observation 6.4.3. In the tree given by outM(σH), sequences of actions are prefix-closed. In other
words, for every sequence α , we have α ◦ (u,a) ∈ act∗(outM(σH))⇒ α ∈ act∗(outM(σH)).
Proposition 6.4.4. SNIM(H,L,A,ΓH) iff SNI-PubM(H,L,A,ΓH).
Proof. By Proposition 6.4.1 we have that SNI-PubM(H,L,A,ΓH) implies SNIM(H,L,A,ΓH). For
the other direction it suffices to show that if SNIM(H,L,A,ΓH) then for every α ∈ act∗(outM(σH))
and σH ∈ ΣH it holds that PurgeH,A(α) ∈ act∗(outM(σH)). We prove this by induction on the size
of α .
Induction base: if α = 〈〉, then PurgeH,A(α)= 〈〉 and also 〈〉 ∈ act∗(outM(σH)), therefore PurgeH,A(α)∈
act∗(outM(σH)).
Induction step: We want to show that if
(I) α ∈ act∗(outM(σH))⇒ PurgeH,A(α) ∈ act∗(outM(σH))
then for all u ∈ U and a ∈ A:
(II) (α ◦ (u,a)) ∈ act∗(outM(σH))⇒ PurgeH,A(α ◦ (u,a)) ∈ act∗(outM(σH))
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We prove it as follows. If (I) then either α /∈ act∗(outM(σH)), in which case by Observation 6.4.3
we have α ◦ (u,a) /∈ act∗(outM(σH)) and therefore (II) is true; or PurgeH,A(α) ∈ act∗(outM(σH)),
in which case we have two possibilities: (a) If u∈H then PurgeH,A(α ◦(u,a)) = PurgeH,A(α). We
assumed that PurgeH,A ∈ act∗(outM(σH)) so PurgeH,A(α ◦ (u,a)) ∈ act∗(outM(σH)) and hence
(II) is true. (b) If u /∈ H then PurgeH,A(α ◦ (u,a)) = PurgeH,A(α) ◦ (u,a). This together with
Observation 6.4.2, u /∈ H and PurgeH,A(α) ∈ act∗(outM(σH)) implies that PurgeH,A(α.(u,a)) ∈
act∗(outM(σH)), therefore (II) is true.
6.5 Formal Characterization of Strategic Noninterference
As mentioned in Chapter 5, noninterference is typically characterised through so called unwinding
relations [GM84, Rus92, vdMZ10]. In this part, we try to characterize strategic noninterference in a
similar way. That is, we look for unwinding relations corresponding to strategies that obtain a given
goal and at the same time prevent information leakage. There are two possible perspectives to this.
First, we can look for unwinding relations whose existence corresponds to existence of a suitable
strategy. Then, we may look for unwindings whose existence guarantees strategic noninterference
for a given strategy.
6.5.1 Unwinding for Strategic Noninterference
We begin with the following negative result.
Proposition 6.5.1. There is no succinct characterization of strategic noninterference with respect
to goals definable in Linear Time Logic.
Proof. We base our proof on the widely conjectured assumption that P 6=NP. We show that if there
exist a succinct characterization of strategic noninterference, then it contradicts this assumption.
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Suppose, to the contrary, that there exists a deterministic1 condition Φ which: (i) is of polynomial
size with respect to the size of the model and the length of the goal formula, and (ii) guarantees
that SNIM(H,L,A,Γ) iff there is an unwinding relation satisfying Φ for M,H,L,A,Γ. Note that
the model checking problem for Linear Time Logic can be embedded in checking strategic non-
interference by assuming that H = /0 and that L have the same observation in every state. Then,
SNIM(H,L,A,Γ) iff Γ is satisfied on every possible path in M. If we have a polynomial time al-
gorithm for the construction of the unwinding relation, and knowing that Φ is also polynomial in
the size of the model, this would give us a nondeterministic polynomial-time procedure for model
checking Linear Time Logic (because the composition of two polynomials is another polynomial).
But as we already know that model checking Linear Time Logic is PSPACE-complete [Sch03], it
implies that PSPACE =P, which in turn implies P=NP, which contradicts our assumption.
It is evident from the proof that the impossibility stems from the hardness of finding a strategy
that obtains a given goal, and not necessarily from the noninterference part. We will now show
that strategic noninterference can indeed be succinctly characterised for a particular class of goals,
namely safety goals.
Definition 6.5.1 (Unwinding Relation for Safety Goal). Let M,H,L be as usual, and ΓS be a safety
goal with safe states S ⊆ St. Moreover, let reach(U) = {s | ∃α ∈ (U,A)∗ , s = exec(α)} denote
the set of reachable states for agents U. We say that ∼ΓS⊆ St×St is an unwinding relation for ΓS
iff ∼ΓS satisfies the following properties:
(OCS) For all s, t ∈ reach(L), if s∼ΓS t then [s]L = [t]L;
(SCS) For all s, t ∈ reach(L), u ∈ L, and a ∈ A, if s∼ΓS t then do(s,u,a)∼ΓS do(t,u,a).
1By “deterministic”, we essentially mean “quantifier-free”. Note that quantification over elements of the model
(e.g., states, agents, and actions) is not a problem, since it can always be unfolded to a quantifier-free form by explicitly
enumerating all the possible values. Such an unfolding incurs only polynomial increase of the size of Φ.
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Proposition 6.5.2. SNI(H,L,A,ΓS) iff reach(U \H) ⊆ S and there exists an unwinding relation
∼ΓS for the safety goal ΓS.
Proof. “⇐” Suppose that reach(U\H)⊆ S and there exists an unwinding relation ∼ΓS . We show
that there exists a strategy σH for agents H such that (i) pathM(σH) ⊆ ΓS, and (ii) for every
α ∈ act∗(outM(σH)) and ul ∈ L we have [exec(α)]ul = [exec(PurgeH,A(α))]ul . We choose σH
to be a positional strategy defined as σH(s) = /0 for all s ∈ St.
i) By the definition of σH , we know that act∗(outM(σH)) ⊆ (U \H,A)∗. This together with
reach(U\H)⊆ S and the definition of safety goal, implies that pathM(σH)⊆ ΓS.
ii) For every α ∈ act∗(outM(σH)) and ul ∈ L, we have α ∈ (U \H,A)∗ by (i), and hence
PurgeH,A(α) = α . Therefore [exec(PurgeH,A(α)]ul = [exec(α)]ul .
By i) and ii) we have that SNI(H,L,A,ΓS) holds.
“⇒” Suppose that SNI(H,L,A,ΓS), and σH is a strategy that satisfies the conditions of strategic
noninterference. We show that there exists an unwinding relation ∼ΓS for the safety goal ΓS. Let
∼ΓS be the relation such that s∼ΓS t if s, t ∈ nodes(outM(σH)) and for all α ∈ (L,A)∗ and ul ∈ L,
[exec(s,α)]ul = [exec(t,α)]ul . We show that ∼ΓS is an unwinding relation for the safety goal ΓS.
i) If α ∈ (U\H,A)∗ then by Observation 6.4.2 we have that α ∈ act∗(outM(σH)), and therefore
exec(α) ∈ S (by strategic noninterference). So reach(U\H)⊆ S.
ii) If we take α = 〈〉, then by definition of∼ΓS we have that for all ul ∈ L and all s, t ∈ reach(L),
[exec(s,α)]ul = [exec(t,α)]ul . So [exec(s,〈〉)]ul = [exec(t,〈〉)]ul , or [s]ul = [t]ul which proves that
∼ΓS satisfies (OCS).
iii) Lastly, we need to prove that∼ΓS satisfies (SCS). Suppose there exists s, t ∈ reach(L), u∈ L
and a ∈ A such that s∼ΓS t and do(s,u,a) 6∼ΓS do(t,u,a). Then there exists α ∈ (L,A)∗ such that
[exec(do(s,u,a),α)]ul 6= [exec(do(t,u,a),α)]ul for some ul ∈ L. It implies that [exec(s,((u,a) ◦
α))]ul 6= [exec(t,((u,a)◦α))]ul , which contradicts s∼ΓS t. Therefore ∼ΓS satisfies (SCS).
It would be interesting to characterize strategic noninterference for other subclasses of goals in
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a similar way. For example reachability goals are another promising class that we leave for future
work.
6.5.2 Strategy-Specific Unwinding Relations
We now turn to characterising strategic noninterference when a strategy is given as a parameter
of the problem. First we define the maximum coverage of a strategy of a player in a state as the
set of all actions that the strategy may allow for the player in some traces. Let σH be a strategy
for H in M. We define the maximum coverage of σH in state s as maxcover(σH ,s) = {a ∈ A |
∃α ∈ act∗(outM(σH)),uh ∈ H. exec(α) = s and α ◦ (uh,a) ∈ act∗(outM(σH))}. Then we define
a strategy to be state-consistent if that strategy always allows the same set of actions in a state
regardless of the history of actions that resulted in that state. We call a strategy σH state-consistent
iff for all s ∈ St, if α ∈ act∗(outM(σH)), exec(α) = s and a ∈ maxcover(σH ,s) then α ◦ (uh,a) ∈
act∗(outM(σH)).
Now we can define the strategy-specific unwinding relation:
Definition 6.5.2 (Strategy-Specific Unwinding Relation). Let M,H,L be as usual, Γ be a goal,
and σH a strategy for H. We call ∼σH⊆ St×St a strategy-specific unwinding relation for σH iff it
satisfies the following properties:
(OCσ ) For all s, t ∈ nodes(outM(σH)) and u ∈ L, if s∼σH t then [s]u = [t]u;
(SCσ ) For all s, t ∈ nodes(outM(σH)), u ∈ L, and a ∈A, if s∼σH t then do(s,u,a)∼σH do(t,u,a);
(LRσ ) For all s∈ nodes(outM(σH)), u∈H, and a∈maxcover(σH ,s), we have that s∼σH do(s,u,a).
Proposition 6.5.3. Let M,H,L,Γ be as before, and σH be a positional strategy for H that obtains
Γ (formally: pathsM(σH)⊆ ΓH). If there exists a strategy-specific unwinding relation for σH then
M satisfies strategic noninterference with respect to σH (formally: for every α ∈ act∗(outM(σH))
and ul ∈ L we have that [exec(α)]ul = [exec(PurgeH,A(α))]ul ).
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Proof. By (OCσ ) it is enough to show that for all α ∈ act∗(outM(σH)), exec(α)∼σH exec(PurgeH,A(α)).
We prove this by induction on the size of α .
Induction base: For α = 〈〉, we have 〈〉 ∈ act∗(outM(σH)) and PurgeH,A(〈〉) = 〈〉. Therefore
exec(〈〉)∼σH exec(PurgeH,A(〈〉)), because ∼σH is reflexive.
Induction step: Suppose that for some α ∈ act∗(outM(σH)), exec(α) ∼σH exec(PurgeH,A(α)).
We show that for any (u,a) such that u∈L and a∈A, either exec(α ◦(u,a))∼σH exec(PurgeH,A(α ◦
(u,a)), or α ◦ (u,a) /∈ act∗(outM(σH)). We consider three cases:
(i) If u ∈ H and a /∈ σH(exec(α)), then α ◦ (u,a) /∈ act∗(outM(σH)).
(ii) If u ∈ H and a ∈ σH(exec(α)), then PurgeH,A(α ◦ (u,a)) = PurgeH,A(α). By (LRσ ) we have
that exec(α) ∼σH exec(α ◦ (u,a)). This together with induction step assumption and transitivity
of ∼σH implies that exec(PurgeH,A(α)) ∼σH exec(α ◦ (u,a)). By substituting PurgeH,A(α) with
PurgeH,A(α ◦ (u,a)) we have exec(α ◦ (u,a))∼σH exec(PurgeH,A(α ◦ (u,a)).
(iii) If u ∈ L then exec(PurgeH,A(α ◦ (u,a))) = do(exec(PurgeH,A(α)),u,a). This, together with
the induction step assumption and (SCσ ), implies that do(exec(α)),u,a)∼σH do(exec(PurgeH,A(α)),u,a).
Therefore exec(α ◦ (u,a))∼σH exec(PurgeH,A(α ◦ (u,a)).
Proposition 6.5.4. Let M,H,L,Γ,σH be as in Proposition 6.5.3. If M satisfies strategic noninter-
ference with respect to σH then there exists a strategy-specific unwinding relation for σH .
Proof. Let ∼σH be the relation such that s∼σH t if s, t ∈ nodes(outM(σH)) and for all α ∈ (L,A)∗
and ul ∈ L, [exec(s,α)]ul = [exec(t,α)]ul . We show that∼σH has the conditions of strategy-specific
unwinding relation for strategy σH .
(i) If we take α = 〈〉, then by definition of ∼σH , for all ul ∈ L and all s, t ∈ nodes(outM(σH),
[exec(s,〈〉)]ul = [exec(t,〈〉)]ul , or [s]ul = [t]ul which proves that ∼σH satisfies OCσ .
(ii) Suppose there exists s, t ∈ nodes(outM(σH)), a∈A and ul ∈L such that s∼σH t but do(s,ul,a) 6∼σH
do(t,ul,a). Then there should exist α ∈ (L,A)∗ and u ∈ L such that [exec(do(s,ul,a),α)]u 6=
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[exec(do(t,ul,a),α]u. Therefore [exec(s,(ul,a)◦α)]u 6= [exec(t,(ul,a)◦α)]u, contradicting s∼σH
t. So it proves that ∼σH satisfies (SCσ ).
(iii) Suppose that s ∈ nodes(outM(σH)), a ∈ maxcover(σH ,s), α ∈ (L,A)∗, ul ∈ L and uh ∈ H .
Then there exist λ ∈ act∗(outM(σH)) such that exec(λ ) = s. By strategic noninterference prop-
erty, [exec(λ ◦α)]ul = [exec(PurgeH,A(λ ◦α)]ul and [exec(λ ◦ (uh,a)◦α)]ul = [exec(PurgeH,A(λ ◦
(uh,a)◦α))]ul . We also know that PurgeH,A(λ ◦(uh,a)◦α)=PurgeH,A(λ ◦α). Using these equal-
ities we have that [exec(λ ◦α)]ul = [exec(λ ◦(uh,a)◦α)]ul , i.e [exec(s,α)]ul = [exec(do(s,uh,a),α)]uh ,
therefore s∼σH do(s,uh,a) (by the definition of ∼σH ) and so (LRσH ) holds.
6.6 Summary
In this chapter, we proposed how to relax the classical requirement of noninterference by taking
into account a strategy that the High players may follow in order to achieve their goals. We also
studied characterization of strategic noninterference through unwinding relations. While showing
that the characterization result is impossible for arbitrary goals, we presented some characterisa-
tions in the form of unwinding relation for specific subclasses of goals and for the settings where
a strategy is given as parameter.
Chapter 7
Effective Security
Many information flow security properties, including noninterference property, are understood as
preventing any information leakage, regardless of how grave or harmless consequences the leak-
age can have. Even in models where each piece of information is classified as either sensitive or
insensitive, the classification is “hardwired” and given as a parameter of the analysis, rather than
derived from more fundamental features of the system. In this chapter, we suggest that information
security is not a goal in itself, but rather a means of preventing potential attackers from compro-
mising the correct behaviour of the system. To formalise this, we first show how two information
flows can be compared by looking at the adversary’s ability to harm the system. Then, we propose
that the information flow in a system is effectively information-secure if it does not allow for more
damage than its idealised variant based on the classical notion of noninterference.
Outline of the chapter. Section 7.1 presents a detailed explanation of the motivation and the
main idea behind the contribution of this chapter. Then in Section 7.2 we give an overview on
some of related works. Section 7.3 reminds some of the preliminary concepts. In Section 7.4, we
define the generic concept of effective security. In Section 7.5, we look specifically at the security
of information flow and show how it can be defined based on the relation between the attacker’s
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observational capabilities and his ability to compromise the goals of the system. In Section 7.6
we extend our results to models that are not total on input. Finally, we summarise the work in
Section 7.7.
7.1 Motivation and the Main Idea
Information plays multiple roles in interactions between agents (be it humans or artificial entities,
e.g., software agents). First, it can be the commodity that the agents compete for; in that case, it
often defines the outcome of the “interaction game”. Key exchange protocols are a good example
here, as the involved honest parties strive to learn the key of the other agent while at the same time
preventing any information leak to the intruder. Secondly, information can define the semantic
content of an action: Typically, most actions specified in a security protocol consist in transmitting
or processing some information. Thirdly, information can be a resource that enables actions and
influences the outcome of the game. This is because agents need information to construct and
execute plans that can be used to achieve their goals.
Most approaches to information flow security adopt the first perspective. That is, information
defines the ultimate goal of the interaction. Classical information security properties specify what
information must not leak, and how it could leak (i.e., what channels of information leakage are
considered), but they do not give an account of why the information should not leak to the intruder.
For example, the property of noninterference [GM82] assumes that the “low clearance” users can-
not learn anything about the activities of the “high clearance” users. In order to violate this, the
“low” users can try to analyse their observations, or execute a sequence of explorative actions of
their own. Nondeducibility on strategies [WJ90] makes the same assumption about what should
not leak, but also takes into account covert channels that some “high” users can use to send signals
to the “low” agents according to a previously agreed code. Anonymity in voting [Cha81, FOO92]
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captures that an observer cannot learn what candidate a particular has voted for by looking at the
voter’s behaviour, scanning the web bulletin board, coercing the voter to hand in the vote receipt,
etc.
As a consequence, the classical properties of information security can only distinguish between
relevant and irrelevant information leaks if the distinction is given explicitly as a parameter, e.g.,
by classifying available actions into sensitive and insensitive [GM82]. However, it is usually hard
(if not impossible) to obtain such a distinction based on the internal characteristics of the actions.
We illustrate the point below through a real-life example.
7.1.1 Motivating Example: Phone Banking
In some phone banking services, the maiden name of the user’s mother is used as a part of au-
thentication, e.g., to change the settings of the account. That is, the user is typically asked to spell
her name, birth date, current address, and her mother’s maiden name in order to change the credit
limit in the account, block/unblock ATM use in specified geographical areas, and so on. Note
that information about one’s birth date and address is fairly easy to obtain in public directories or
repositories kept and marketed by various web services that require the data for registration. So,
the mother’s maiden name plays the role of a "strong test of identity" in this scenario.1 Consider
now a user posting an essay about some ancestor of hers on her blog, mentioning the name of the
ancestor. If the essay is about the user’s mother, it reveals potentially dangerous information. This
is, among other things, because an intruder can use the information to: (1) access the phone bank-
ing service, (2) authenticate impersonating the user, (3) change (in the user’s profile) the telephone
number used for web banking password recovery and sms authentication of web banking transac-
tions, (4) change the web banking password of the user, and finally (5) log in and transfer money
from the user’s account. On the other hand, if the post is about some other member of the user’s
1This is a real-life example from with BNP Paribas in one of EU countries. For similar security questions, used by
various phone or web services, cf. e.g. [Lev08].
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family (father, grandmother, paternal grandfather, etc.) revealing the name of the person is proba-
bly harmless. Note that it is impossible to distinguish between the two pieces of information (say,
the mother’s maiden name vs. the grandmother’s maiden name) based on their internal features.
Both have the same syntactic structure of a single word (i.e., a string of characters with no blank
spaces) and the same semantic content (a family name of a person; more precisely, the family name
of the person at birth). The only difference lies in the context: the first kind of information is used
in some important social procedures, while the second one is not.
7.1.2 Information as Strategic Resource
We claim that a broader perspective is needed to model and analyse appropriately such scenarios.
Agents compete for information not for its sake, but for reasons that go beyond purely epistemic
advantages. An intruder may want to know the password of a PayPal user to impersonate the user
and steal some real money by making a payment to his own benefit (possibly via an account of a
suitable “mule”). An industry player may need encryption keys used in internal communication
between employees of its main competitor to find out about the competitor’s current business
strategy. A political activist needs the ability to learn the value of someone’s vote in order to
effectively coerce that person into voting for the candidate that the activist is rallying for. Thus,
in most security scenarios, information is a resource rather than a commodity. More precisely,
information is a commodity that the players compete for in an “information security game” but
the game is played in the context of a “real” game where information is only a resource, enabling
(some) players to achieve their non-epistemic goals. As players obtain new information, their
uncertainty is reduced, and they increase their ability to choose a good strategy in the real game.
What would a significant information leak be in this view? To answer the question, we draw
inspiration from the concept of the value of information from decision theory [How66]: a piece
of information is worth as much as it increases the expected payoff of the player. Similarly, an
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information leak is significant if it increases the ability of the attacker to construct a damaging
attack strategy in the real game.
7.1.3 Main Idea and Contribution of the Chapter
The main idea behind our contribution in this chapter of the thesis can be summarised as follows.
We consider three questions:
• How can we evaluate the ability of an adversary to harm the goal of the system?
• How can we compare two systems with regard to the ability of attackers to damage the goal
of the system in them?
• How can we know whether the ability (or inability) of the attacker to harm the goal of the
system is because of some leakage of information to the attacker or not?
This chapter is structured to discuss these questions in order. First, we use the concept of
surely winning strategies from game theory to analyse the adversary’s strategic ability to disrupt
the correct behaviour of the system. This can be a functionality property, a security property, or a
combination of the two kinds. Also, it can arise from a goal of the “high clearance” agents or an
objective assigned to the system by its designers or its owners. Preventing the attacker from having
a winning attack strategy is what the designer of the system may want to achieve. We will see the
effective security of the system as the attacker’s inability to come up with such a strategy. Secondly,
we use the notion of effective security for comparing two systems by looking at the strategic ability
of an adversary to harm the goal of the system. Thirdly, a successful attack strategy can exist due
to flawed design of either the control flow or the information flow in the system. Here, we are
interested in the latter. That is, we want to distinguish between vulnerabilities coming from the
control vs. the information flow, and single out systems where redesigning the flow of information
alone can make the system more secure. To this end, we define the noninterferent idealised variant
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of the system, which has the same control flow as the original system, but with the information
reduced so that the system satisfies noninterference. Then, we define the system to be effectively
information-secure if it is as good as its noninterfering idealised variant. As the main technical
result, we show that the concept is well defined, i.e., the maximal noninterferent variant exists for
every state-transition model.
7.2 Related Works
An overview of the works on information flow security and noninterference properties is given in
Section 5.1. Most of these works assume that the information flow in the system is secure only
when no information ever flows from High to Low players. Here, we want to discard irrelevant
information leaks, and only look at the significant ones (in the sense that the leaking information
can be used to construct an attack on a higher-order correctness property).
The problem of how to weaken noninterference to capture security guarantees for real systems
has also been extensively studied. Most notably, postulates and policies for declassification (called
also information release) were studied, cf. [SS05] for an introduction. This submission can be
viewed as an attempt to determine what information is acceptable to declassify. In this sense, our
results can useful in proposing new declassification policies and evaluating existing ones. We note,
however, that the existing works on declassification are mainly concerned by the question what
information can be released, when, where, and by whom. In contrast, we propose an argument
for why it can be released. Moreover, declassification is typically about intentional release of
information, whereas we do not distinguish between intentional and accidental information flow.
Finally, the research on declassification assumes that security is defined by some given “secrets”
to be protected. In our approach, no information is intrinsically secret, but the information flow is
harmful if it enables the attacker to gain more strategic ability against the goals of the system.
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Parameterised noninterference [GM04] can be seen as a theoretical counterpart of declassifica-
tion, where security of information flow is parameterised by the analytic capabilities of the attacker.
Again, that research does not answer why some information must be kept secret while some other
needs not, and in particular it does not take the strategic power of the attacker into account.
Economic and strategic analysis of security properties is a growing field in general, cf. e.g. [AMNO07,
MA11, DR07, BM07, YKK+10, KYK+11]. A number of papers have applied game-theoretic con-
cepts to define the security of information flow [MH99, HNS02, HJR+13, Dim14, FPM+14, JT15].
However, most of those papers [MH99, HNS02, HJR+13, Dim14] use games only in a narrow
mathematical sense to provide a proof system (called the game semantics) for deciding security
properties. We are aware of only a handful of papers that investigate the impact of participants’ in-
centives and available strategies on the security of information flow. In [AG04, GCC08], economic
interpretations of privacy-preserving behavior are proposed. [FPM+14] uses game-theoretic solu-
tion concepts (in particular, Nash equilibrium) to prescribe the optimal defence strategy against
attacks on information security. In contrast, our approach is analytic rather than prescriptive, as
we do not propose how to manage information security. Moreover, in our view, privacy is not the
goal but rather the means to achieve some higher-level objectives. We also in Chapter 6 proposed
a weaker variant of noninterference by allowing the High players to select an appropriate strategy,
while here we look at the potential damage inflicted by adverse strategies of the Low users.
Our idea of looking at the unique most precise non-interfering variant of the system is related
on the technical level to [GM04]. There, attackers displaying different analytical capabilities are
defined by abstract interpretation, which leads to a lattice of noninterference variants with various
strength. Attackers with weakened observational powers were also studied in [ZM03].
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Figure 7.1 Transition network Ma in which the High player publishes her grandmother’s
maiden name on her blog. Only the observations of L are shown
7.3 Revisiting the Preliminaries
In this chapter we revisit the concepts of noninterference, transition networks, strategies and goals
of the players, which are explained in Chapter 5. We remind these concepts using the scenario
introduced in Section 7.1
Example 7.3.1. Consider a simplified version of the phone banking scenario of Subsection 7.1.1.
Figure 7.1 and Figure 7.2 presents simple transition networks for the scenario. The users are H
who has an account in the bank, and L who may try to impersonate H. We consider two alternative
variants: one where H publishes her grandmother’s maiden name on the blog (Figure 7.1), and
one where she publishes her mother’s maiden name (Figure 7.2). To keep the graph simple, we
assume that the possible names are A and B in the former case, and C and D in the latter. Labels
on transitions show the personalised actions resulting in the transition, and the observations of
users in each state are shown beside the state. The observations of L are shown beside each state.
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Figure 7.2 Transition network Mb in which H publishes her mother’s maiden name
The observations for H are omitted, as they will be irrelevant for our analysis.
Each model begins by initialization of the relevant names, represented by virtual actions of
agent H. Then, H publishes an essay on her blog. In the first variant, the essay mentions the
maiden name of H’s grandmother. In the second variant, it mentions her mother’s maiden name.
After H has published the essay, L can check the blog (action chkWeb). The resulting observation
of L depends on what is published. Then, authentication proceeds: to log in, a user must give the
correct value of H’s mother’s maiden name.
Note that, for mathematical completeness, we must define the outcome of every user-action
pair in every state. We assume that there are two “error states” sHErr,sLErr in models Ma and Mb
(not shown in the graphs). Any action of H not depicted in the figure leads to sHErr, and any action
of L not depicted in the figure leads to sLErr. We will later use the error states in the definition of the
players’ goals, in such a way that L will always want to avoid sLErr and H will want to avoid sHErr.
This way we can (however imperfectly) simulate some synchronisation in the restricted framework
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of Goguen and Meseguer.
It is easy to see that neither Ma nor Mb satisfies noninterference from H to L. For instance, in
the model from Figure 7.1, the observation of L after sequence
α = 〈(H,setMNameA),(H,setGNameD),(H, publish),(L,chkWeb)〉 is GNameD, but the observa-
tion of L after PurgeH(α) = 〈(L,chkWeb)〉 is noObs, which is clearly different.
Example 7.3.2. Consider the models in Figure 7.1 and Figure 7.2, and suppose that L wants to
access H’s bank account. This can be expressed by the reachability goal ΓT with T = {s15,s16}
as the target states. In fact, L also wins if H executes an out-of-place action (cf. Example 7.3.1 for
detailed explanation). In consequence, the winning states for L are T= {s15,s16,sHErr}. Note that
L has no strategy that guarantees ΓT in model Ma (although information is theoretically leaking
to L as the model does not satisfy noninterference). Even performing the action chkWeb does not
help, because L cannot distinguish between states s11 and s13, and there is no single action that
succeeds for both s11,s13. Thus, L does not know whether to use authA or authB to get access to
H’s bank account.
On the other hand, L has a winning strategy for ΓT in model Mb. The strategy is to execute
chkWeb after H publishes her mother’s maiden name, and afterwards do authA in states s11,s12
(after observing MNameA) or authB if the system gets to s13,s14 (i.e., after observing MNameB).

7.4 Security as Strategic Property
The property of noninterference looks for any leakage of any information. If one can possibly
happen in the system, then the system is deemed insecure. In many cases, this view is too strong.
There are lots of information pieces that can leak out without bothering any interested party. Re-
vealing the password to your web banking account can clearly have much more disastrous effects
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than revealing the price that you paid for metro tickets on your latest trip to Paris. Moreover, the
relevance of an information leak cannot, in general, be determined by the type of the informa-
tion. Think, again, of revealing the maiden name of your mother vs. the maiden name of your
grandmother. The former case is potentially dangerous since the maiden name of one’s mother is
often used to grant access to manage banking services by telephone. Revealing the latter is quite
harmless to most ends and purposes.2
We suggest that the relevance of information leakage should be judged by the extent of damage
that the leak allows the attackers to inflict on the goal of the system. Thus, as the first step, we
define the security of the system in terms of damaging abilities of the L players.
In order to assess the relevance of information flow from H to L, we will look at the resulting
strategic abilities of L players. For this, two design choices have to be made. First, what type
of strategies are L players supposed to use? Secondly, what is the goal that they are assumed to
pursue? The second question is of particular importance, because typically we do not know (and
often do not care about) the real goals of potential attackers. What we are aware of, and what we
want to protect, is the objective that the system is built for.
We follow the game-theoretic tradition of looking at the worst case and assuming the opponents
to be powerful and adversary. Thus, we assume L players to use perfect recall strategies. Moreover,
we assume that the goal of L players is to violate a given goal of the system. The goal can be a
functionality or a security requirement, or a combination of both. Moreover, it can originate from a
private goal of the H players, an objective ascribed to the system by its designer (e.g., the designer
of a contract signing protocol), or a combination of requirements specified by the owner/primary
stakeholder in the system (for instance, a bank in case of a web banking infrastructure).
Definition 7.4.1 (Effective security). Let M be a transition network with some Low players L⊆ U,
and let Γ be the goal of the system. We say that M is effectively secure for (L,Γ) iff L does not have
2Note, however, that revealing the maiden name of your maternal grandmother is potentially dangerous to your
mother if she enables banking by telephone.
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a strategy to enforce Γ, where X denotes the complement of set X. That is, the system is effectively
secure iff the attackers do not have a strategy that ensures an execution violating the goal of the
system. We will use ES(M,L,Γ) to refer to this property.
Besides judging the effective security of a system, we can also use the concept to compare the
security level of two models.
Definition 7.4.2 (Comparative effective security). Let M,M′ be two models, and Γ be a goal in
M,M′ (i.e., Γ⊆ paths(M)∪ paths(M′)). We say that:
• M has strictly less effective security than M′ for (L,Γ), denoted M ≺L,Γ M′, iff ES(M′,L,Γ)
but not ES(M,L,Γ). That is, L can enforce a behavior of the system that violates its goal in
model M but not in M′. We denote the relationship by M ≺L,Γ M′;
• M′ is at least as effectively secure as M for (L,Γ), denoted ML,Γ M′, iff ES(M,L,Γ) implies
ES(M′,L,Γ);
• M is effectively equivalent to M′ for (L,Γ), denoted M 'L,Γ M′, iff either both ES(M,L,Γ)
and ES(M′,L,Γ) hold, or both do not hold.
Thus, if in one of the models L can construct a more harmful strategy, then the model displays
lower effective security than the other model. Conversely, if both models allow only for the same
extent of damage, then they have the same level of effective security. This way, we can order
different alternative designs of the system according to the strategic power they give away to the
attacker.
Example 7.4.1. Consider models Ma,Mb from Figure 7.1 and Figure 7.2, and let the goal Γ be
to prevent L from accessing H’s bank account. Thus, Γ is the safety goal ΓS with S = St \
{s15,s16,sHErr}, and therefore Γ = ΓT with T = {s15,s16,sHErr}. As we saw in Example 7.3.2,
L has no strategy to guarantee Γ in Ma, but she has a surely winning strategy for Γ in Mb. Thus,
Mb is strictly less effectively secure than Ma, i.e., Mb ≺L,Γ Ma.
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We will further use the concept to compare security of alternative information flows based on
the same (or similar) action-transition structures.
7.5 Effective Information Security
We will now propose a scheme that allows determining whether a given model of interaction leaks
relevant information or not. We use the idea of refinement checking from process algebras, where
a process is assumed to be correct, if and only if it refines the ideal process [RHB97]. A similar
reasoning scheme is also used in the analysis of multi-party computation protocols (a protocol is
correct iff it is equivalent to the ideal model of the computation [GMW87]).
To this end, we need a suitable notion of refinement or equivalence and a suitable definition of
the ideal model. The former is straightforward: we will use the 'L,Γ relation. The latter is more
involved. If the reference model ascribes too much observational capabilities to the L players then
the concept will be ill-defined (it will classify insecure systems as secure). If the reference model
assigns L players with too little information, then the concept will be useless (no realistic system
will be ever classified as secure).
In what follows, we first explain and define the concept of an idealised variant of a model.
Then in Section 7.5.2 we do our first take on the idealised variant by defining the blind variant of
a model. In Section 7.5.3 we first define the non-interfering idealised variant of a model.
7.5.1 Ability-Based Security of Information Flows
Definition 7.4.2 allows for comparing the effective security of two alternative information flows.
We will say two models differ only in their information flow if they are transition equivalent:
Definition 7.5.1 (Transition-equivalent models). The action-transition frame of a model M, which
we denote by FM, is the network M minus the observation functions obs(·). We will denote the set
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of models based on frame F byM (F). Two models are transition-equivalent iff they are based on
the same frame.
Then , (F,obs) ≺ (F,obs′) says that the observation function obs leaks more relevant infor-
mation than obs′ in the transition-action frame F . However, we usually do not want to compare
several alternative information flows. Rather, we want to determine if a single given model M
reveals relevant information or not. How can we achieve that? A natural idea is to compare the
effective security of M to an ideal model, i.e., a model that is transition equivalent to the original
model and moreover leaks no relevant information by construction. Then, a model is effectively
information-secure if it has the same level of effective security as its idealised variant:
Definition 7.5.2 (Effective information security). Let M be a transition network with some Low
players L⊆ U, and let Γ be the goal of the system. Moreover, let Ideal(M) be the idealised variant
of M. We say that M is effectively information-secure for (L,Γ) iff M 'L,Γ Ideal(M).
How do we construct the idealised variant of M? The idea is to “blur” observations of Low
so that we obtain a variant of the system where the observational capabilities of the attackers are
minimal. What observational capabilities are “minimal”? We start with the following, rather naive
definition of idealisation.
7.5.2 Blinding the Low Players: First Attempt
By using the idealised model, we intend to distinguish to what extent the damaging abilities of L
players are due to the “hard” actions available in the system, and to what extent they are due to the
available information flow. In other words, we want to see how far one can minimize the strategic
ability of the L players by reducing their observational abilities in the model.
The first take to define an idealised model is to assume that L never sees anything. To this end,
we simply assume that obs(s,L) is the same in all states s ∈ St.
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Definition 7.5.3 (Idealised model, first take). Having a transition network M based on frame F,
and a set of players L, we define the blind variant of M as M′ = (F,obs′) such that obs′(q, l) =
obs(q′, l) for every q,q′ ∈ St and l ∈ L.
In many scenarios this is too much. In particular, a L agent may have access to perfectly
legitimate observations that are inherent to maintaining their private affairs, such as checking the
balance of their bank account, listing the files stored on in their private file space, etc.
7.5.3 Idealised Models Based on Noninterference
Below we propose a weaker form of “blinding” that will be used to single out the damaging abilities
that are due to L observing H’s actions, rather than due to any observations that L players can
happen to make. We begin by recalling the notion of term unification which is a fundamental
concept in automated theorem proving and logic programming [Rob65]. Given two terms t1, t2,
their unification (t1 ≡ t2) can be understood as a declaration that, from now on, both terms refer
to exactly the same underlying object. In our case, the terms are observation labels from the set
Obs. Unification can be seen as an equivalence relation on observation labels, or equivalently as
a partitioning of the labels into equivalence classes. The application of the unification to a model
yields a similar model where the equivalent observations are “blurred”.
Definition 7.5.4 (Unification of observations). Given a set of observation labels Obs, a unification
on Obs is any equivalence relation U ⊆ Obs×Obs.
Given a model M = 〈St,s0,U,A,Obs,obs,do〉 and a unification U ⊆ Obs×Obs, the applica-
tion ofU to M is the modelU (M) = 〈St,s0,U,A,Obs′,obs′,do〉, where: Obs′= {[o]U | o ∈ Obs}
replaces Obs by the set of equivalence classes defined byU , and obs′(q,u)= [obs(q,u)]U replaces
the original observation in q with its equivalence class for any u ∈ U.
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Figure 7.3 An example of unification of observations.
Example 7.5.1. Figure 7.3 depicts the model obtained from Mb by unifying observations MNameA
and MNameB into {MNameA,MNameB}, observations init and noObs into {init,noObs}, and
observation accessL into {accessL}.
Our reference model for M will be the variant of M where noninterference is obtained by the
minimal necessary “blurring” of L’s observations.
Definition 7.5.5 (Noninterferent idealised model). Having a transition network M and a set of
“Low” players L, we define the noninterfering idealised variant of M as U (M) such that:
(i) NIU (M)(H,L), and
(ii) for every U ′ (U it is not the case that NIU ′(M)(H,L).
We need to show that the concept of noninterferent idealised model is well defined. The proof
is constructive, i.e., given a model M, we first show how one can build its idealised variant, and
then show that it is unique.
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Theorem 7.5.1. For every transition network M, there is always a unique unificationU satisfying
properties (i) and (ii) from Definition 7.5.5.
The proof of Theorem 7.5.1 needs some preliminary steps. First use the concept of unwinding
relations [GM84, Rus92, vdMZ10], which was discussed in Chapter 5, to define the relation R∗M
on the states of a transition network M. Then we use this relation for constructing and proving the
uniqueness of the idealised variant of M.
For defining relation R∗M, first we relate any two states of M if one of them can be reached from
the other one by a sequence of H personalised actions. Then in each step, we relate the pair of
states that are reached by a similar Low personalized action from any two states that are already
related. Also, we enforce transitivity on the set. We continue adding related states until the relation
becomes stable.
The mathematical definition of R∗M is as follows:
Definition 7.5.6 (Relation R∗M for a transition network M). Given a model M= 〈St,s0,U,A,Obs,obs,do〉
and sets of High players H and Low players L, we define the relation R∗M ⊆ St× St as the least
fixpoint of the following function F, transforming relations on St:
F(R) = R0 ∪
{(t1, t2) | ∃(s1,s2) ∈ R, l ∈ L,a ∈ A. do(s1, l,a) = t1,do(s2, l,a) = t2}∪
{(t1, t2) | ∃s ∈ St. (t1,s) ∈ R&(s, t2) ∈ R},
where (s1,s2)∈R0 iff for some sequence of personalized actions of High players α , either s1, α−→ s2,
or s2
α−→ s1.
It is straightforward to see that R∗M is an equivalence relation (for reflexivity, notice that for
any s ∈ St, s α−→ s for α = 〈〉, and therefore (s,s) ∈ R0). We will now show that if M satisfies
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noninterference then R∗M is the smallest unwinding relation. Conversely, if M does not satisfy
noninterference then R∗M indicates pairs of states that must bear the same observations for Low
if we want to make the model M non-interferent. We will later show that it is sufficient to unify
Low’s observations in states connected by R∗M in order to obtain a non-interferent variant of M. In
consequence, R∗M generates the minimal unification that achieves the task.
The following proposition shows that if M satisfies the noninterference property, then R∗M is a
subset of any unwinding relations on the states of M.
Proposition 7.5.2. Given a model M and sets of players H and L, if ∼NIL is an unwinding relation
on the states of M and relation R∗M is defined as in Definition 7.5.6, then R∗M ⊆ ∼NIL .
Proof. As the relation R∗M is constructed by adding related states in several steps, we do the proof
by induction on these steps. We show that firstly R0 ⊆ ∼NIL , and secondly all related pair of states
added in each step also is in ∼NIL .
Induction base: If (s1,s2) ∈ R0, then for some sequence of personalized actions of High players
α , either s1,
α−→ s2, or s2 α−→ s1, hence by property (LR) , and transitivity of the unwinding relation
it holds that (s1,s2) ∈ ∼NIL . Therefore R0 ⊆ ∼NIL .
Induction step: We show that if Ri ⊆ ∼NIL , then F(Ri) ⊆ ∼NIL holds. F(Ri) is constructed by
union of three sets. We show that all these three sets are subsets of ∼NIL :
i- Ri ∈ ∼NIL by the induction step assumption.
ii- If (s1,s2) ∈ Ri then by induction step assumption (s1,s2) ∈ ∼NIL . So for any t1, t2 ∈ St, a ∈ A
and l ∈ L such that do′(s1, l,a) = t1 and do′(s2, l,a) = t2, by property (SC) of unwinding relation
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it holds that (t1, t2) ∈ ∼NIL . Therefore:
{(t1, t2) | ∃(s1,s2) ∈ R, l ∈ L,a ∈ A·
do′(s1, l,a) = t1,do′(s2, l,a) = t2}
⊆ ∼NIL .
iii- If (t1,s) ∈ Ri and (s, t2) ∈ Ri, then by induction step assumption it holds that (t1,s) ∈ ∼NIL and
(t2,s) ∈ ∼NIL . Therefore by transitivity of ∼NIL it entails that (t1, t2) ∈ ∼NIL , hence:
{(t1, t2) | ∃s ∈ St · (t1,s) ∈ R and (s, t2) ∈ R}
⊆ ∼NIL .
By i, ii, and iii we infer that F(Ri)⊆ ∼NIL , and therefore by induction base and induction step
we have that R∗M ⊆ ∼NIL .
Now we show that if the model M, L players have the same observations at any two states
related by R∗M, then M satisfies noninterference.
Lemma 7.5.3. In a model M with sets of players H and L, if for any l ∈ L, s1,s2 ∈ St it is the case
that (s1,s2) ∈ R∗M implies obs(s1, l) = obs(s2, l), then R∗ is an unwinding relation on the states of
M and therefore it holds that NIM(H,L).
Proof. We prove this by showing that R∗M satisfies the conditions of Definition 5.1.6: The relation
R∗M is an equivalence relation, condition (OC) follows from the assumption of this lemma, and
conditions (SC) and (LR) follow from the definition of the relation R∗M. Therefore it holds that
NIM(H,L).
And as the last step before introducing the unification of function U ∗M, we show that if M
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satisfies noninterference, then R∗M is an unwinding relation on its states (and by Proposition 7.5.2
it is in fact the smallest unwinding relation).
Proposition 7.5.4. In a model M with sets of players H and L, if NIM(H,L) then R∗M is an unwind-
ing relation on states of M.
Proof. If NIM(H,L) then by Proposition 5.1.1 there is an unwinding relation ∼NIL on the states of
M. By Proposition 7.5.2 R∗M ⊆ ∼NIL and therefore for any l ∈ L, s1,s2 ∈ St such that (s1,s2) ∈ R∗M
it is the case that (s1,s2) ∈ ∼NIL and therefore obs(s1, l) = obs(s2, l). Hence by Lemma 7.5.3 R∗M
is an unwinding relation on the states of M.
Now, by using relation R∗M, we define the unification of observations U ∗M that will provide the
noninterferent idealised variant of M.
Definition 7.5.7 (Unification for noninterference U ∗M). We define the unification of observations
U ∗M ⊆Obs×Obs as follows. For any o1,o2 ∈Obs, we have (o1,o2)∈U ∗M iff there exist s1,s2, t1, t2 ∈
St and l ∈ L such that:
(a) obs(s1, l) = o1,
(b) obs(s2, l) = o2,
(c) (s1, t1) ∈ R∗M,
(d) (s2, t2) ∈ R∗M, and
(e) obs(t1, l) = obs(t2, l).
It then holds that U ∗M(M) satisfies the noninterference property (Proposition 7.5.6) and no
refinement of U ∗M achieves that (Proposition 7.5.7). The following lemma states that if two states
are related by R∗M, then their observations are unified by U ∗M.
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Lemma 7.5.5. In a model M, for any s1,s2 ∈ St and l ∈L, if (s1,s2)∈R∗M then (obs(s1, l),obs(s2, l))∈
U ∗M.
Proof. Assume (s1,s2) ∈ R∗M and l ∈ L. For proving that (obs(s1, l),obs(s2, l)) ∈ U ∗M we verify
the conditions in Definition 7.5.7. By taking obs(s1, l) = obs1 and obs(s2, l) = obs2, conditions (a)
and (b) are satisfied trivially. If we take t1 := s2 and t2 := s2, then (s1, t1) ∈ R∗M by the proposition
assumption and (s2, t2) ∈ R∗M by reflexivity of R∗M. These prove conditions (c) and (d). Condition
(e) is also satisfied because t1 = t2. Therefore (obs(s1, l),obs(s2, l)) ∈U ∗M.
As the next step, we show that U ∗M(M) satisfies the noninterference property.
Proposition 7.5.6. Given a model M, and U ∗M(M) = 〈St,s0,U,A,Obs∗,obs∗,do〉 defined as in
Definition 7.5.7 on M, it holds that NIU ∗M(M)(H,L).
Proof. For the proof, we are going to use Lemma 7.5.3 and show that for any two states s1,s2 and
l ∈ L, if (s1,s2) ∈ R∗U ∗M(M) then obs
∗(s1, l) = obs∗(s2, l). First notice that R∗M = R∗U ∗M(M), because
M and U ∗M(M) differ only in their observation functions and the definition of R∗ relation does not
depend on the observation function of the model. So for any (s1,s2) ∈ R∗U ∗M(M) and l ∈ L we have
that (s1,s2) ∈ R∗M, and by Lemma 7.5.5 it follows that (obs(s1, l),obs(s2, l)) ∈ U ∗M, and therefore
obs∗(s1, l) = obs∗(s2, l). Hence by Lemma 7.5.3 it holds that R∗U ∗M(M) is an unwinding relation for
U ∗M(M)’and therefore NIU ∗M(M)(H,L).
As the last step before proving Theorem 7.5.1, we show thatU ∗M is the minimal unification that
makes the model M noninterfering.
Proposition 7.5.7. Given a model M, and sets of players H and L, for any unification of observa-
tions U where U(M) = 〈St,s0,U,A,Obs′,obs′,do〉, if NIU(M)(H,L) then U ∗M ⊆U.
Proof. Assume U is a unification of observations for model M such that NIU(M)(H,L) and assume
(obs1,obs2) ∈ U ∗M. We show that (obs1,obs2) ∈ U and hence U ∗M ⊆ U . By the definition of
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Figure 7.4 The noninterfering idealised variant of the banking model Mb, where obsI is
the unification of init, noObs, MNameA and MNameB
.
U ∗M, there exists s1,s2, t1, t2 ∈ St, l ∈ L such that obs(s1, l) = obs1, obs(s2, l) = obs2, (s1, t1) ∈ R∗M,
(s2, t2)∈ R∗M and obs(t1, l) = obs(t2, l). By NIU(M)(H,L) and Proposition 7.5.4 we have that R∗U(M)
is an unwinding relation for U(M). So as R∗M = R∗U(M), R
∗
M is also an unwinding relation for U(M).
Therefore by property (OC) of unwinding relation, from (s1, t1) ∈ R∗M and (s2, t2) ∈ R∗M we entail
that obs′(s1, l) = obs′(t1, l) and obs′(s2, l) = obs′(t2, l). Using the definition of obs′(.) we have
that (obs(s1, l),obs(t1, l)) ∈U and (obs(s2, l),obs(t2, l)) ∈U . So, as obs(t1, l) = obs(t2, l) and by
transitivity property of U , we infer that (obs(s1),obs(s2))∈U , and it follows that (obs1,obs2)∈U .
Therefore U ∗M ⊆U .
We can now complete the proof of Theorem 7.5.1.
Proof of Theorem 7.5.1. We want to prove that, given a model M, set of players H and L, and
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any unification of observations U , if U (M) is a noninterfering idealised variant of M, then U =
U ∗M. Assume that U (M) is a noninterfering idealised variant of M. By property (i) of Definition
7.5.5 and Proposition 7.5.7 we infer that U ∗M ⊆ U . Also, by Proposition 7.5.6, we have that
NIU ∗M(M)(H,L). Therefore by property (ii) of Definition 7.5.5 it holds that U =U
∗
M.
From now on, we assume that Ideal(M) refers to the noninterfering idealised variant of M.
Example 7.5.2. Consider models Ma,Mb in Figure 7.1 and Figure 7.1. We recall that both mod-
els are not noninterferent. Figure 7.4 shows the idealised variant Ideal(Mb) of Mb, obtained by
unification U∗Mb (see Definition 7.5.7). In the noninterferent idealised variant of Mb, observa-
tions init, noObs, MnameA, and MNameB of L are unified and replaced by the equivalence class
{init,noObs,MNameA,MNameB}, represented by obsI in the figure. The idealised variant of Ma
is constructed analogously by unification of init, noObs, MnameC, and MNameD. Clearly, L has
no surely winning strategy to guarantee Γ = ΓT for T = {s15,s16,sHErr} in both Ideal(Ma) and
Ideal(Mb).
Recall from Example 7.4.1 that L has no winning strategy for Γ in Ma, but she has one in
Mb. So, Ma 'L,Γ Ideal(Ma), but Mb 6'L,Γ Ideal(Mb). Thus, Ma is effectively information-secure for
(L,Γ), but Mb is not. 
It is important to notice that noninterferent variants are indeed idealisations:
Proposition 7.5.8. For every M, L, and Γ, we have that M L,Γ Ideal(M).
Proof. Note that M and Ideal(M) differ only in their observation functions. Also we have that
for any pair of states s1,s2 ∈ St, if [s1]ML = [s2]ML then [s1]Ideal(M)L = [s2]Ideal(M)L . Therefore all the
strategies of L in Ideal(M) are also L’s strategies in M. Thus for any for any goal Γ ⊆ paths(M),
if L have a surely winning strategy to enforce Γ in Ideal(M) then they also have a surely winning
strategy for Γ in M, qed.
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Finally, note that the concept of noninterference in our construction of effective security can
be in principle replaced by an arbitrary constraint of information leakage. The same reasoning
scheme could be applied to noninference, nondeducibility, strategic noninterference, and so on.
The pattern does not change: given a “classical” propertyP of information security, we define the
idealised variant of M through the minimal unification U such that that U(M) satisfies P . Then,
M is effectively secure in the context of propertyP iff it is strategically equivalent to U(M).
We leave the investigation of which information security properties have unique minimal uni-
fications for future work.
7.6 Extending the Results to a Broader Class of Models
As mentioned before, the models of Goguen and Meseguer are “total on input,” i.e., each action
label is available to every user at every state. This makes modeling actual systems very cumber-
some. We have seen that in the previous examples where spurious states had to be added to the
analysis to allow for some synchronization between actions of different agents. In this section,
we consider a broader class of models, and show how our results carry over to the more expres-
sive setting. That is, we consider partial transition networks (PTS) M = 〈St,s0,U,A,Obs,obs,do〉
which are similar to the transition networks defined in Chapter 5, except that the transition function
do : St×U×A⇀ St can be a partial function. By do(s,u,a) = undef we denote that action a is
unavailable to user u in state s; additionally, we define act(s,u) = {a ∈ A | do(s,u,a) 6= undef} as
the set of actions available to u in s. Moreover, we assume that players are aware of their available
actions, and hence can distinguish states with different repertoires of choices – formally, for any
u ∈ U,s1,s2 ∈ St, if obs(s1,u) = obs(s2,u) then act(s1,u) = act(s2,u).
We begin by a suitable update of the definition of noninterference:
Definition 7.6.1 (Noninterference for partial transition networks). Given a PTS M and sets of
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agents H,L, such that H ∪ L = U,H ∩ L = /0, we say that H is non-interfering with L iff for all
α ∈ (U×A)∗ and all ul ∈ L, if exec(α) 6= undef then [exec(α)]ul = [exec(PurgeH(α))]ul . We
denote the property also by NIM(H,L), thus slightly overloading the notation.
Note that Definition 5.1.4 is a special case of Definition 7.6.1. We now define the noninterferent
idealised variant based on the total extension of a PTS.
Definition 7.6.2 (U-total extension). Given a PTS M = 〈St,s0,U,A,Obs,obs,do〉 and a subset of
users U ⊆ U, we define the U-total variant of M as totalU(M) = 〈St,s0,U,A,Obs,obs,do′〉 where
the transition function do′(.) is defined as follows: for every s∈ St, v∈U and a∈A, do′(s,v,a) = s
if for some u ∈U we have v = u and do(s,u,a) = undef , otherwise do′(s,v,a) = do(s,v,a).
Definition 7.6.3 (Noninterferent idealised model for PTS). Given a partial transition network M
and a set of “low” players L, we define the noninterferent idealised variant of M asU (totalL(M))
such that:
(i) NIU (totalL(M))(H,L), and
(ii) for every U ′ (U it is not the case that NIU ′(totalL(M))(H,L).
The uniqueness theorem is then stated similar to Theorem 7.5.1:
Theorem 7.6.1. For every partial transition network M, there is always a unique unification U
satisfying properties (i) and (ii) from Definition 7.6.3.
The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 7.5.1, with the difference that we use R∗totalL(M)
instead of R∗M for constructing the idealised variant. However, as we use the concept of unwid-
ing relation as the basis for using the R∗ relation for constructing the idealised variant, we first
need to modify the definition of the unwinding relation in Definition 5.1.6 and its corresponding
proposition, Proposition 5.1.1 to adapt them to the new model:
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Definition 7.6.4 (Unwinding for Noninterference in PTN). Let M be a transition network, H a set
of High agents, and L a set of Low agents. Then, ∼NIL ⊆ St× St is an unwinding relation iff it
is an equivalence relation satisfying the conditions of output consistency (OC), step consistency
(SC), and local respect (LR). That is, for all states s, t ∈ St:
(OC) If s∼NILt then [s]L = [t]L;
(SC) If s∼NILt, u ∈ L, and a ∈ A then a ∈ act(s,u) implies do(s,u,a)∼NILdo(t,u,a);
(LR) If u ∈ H and a ∈ A then a ∈ act(s,u) implies s∼NILdo(s,u,a).
Proposition 7.6.2. NIM(H,L) iff there exist an unwinding relation ∼NIL on the states of M that
satisfies (OC), (SC) and (LR).
Proof. “⇐” Suppose that there exists an unwinding relation ∼NIL satisfying (OC), (SC) and (LR).
We show for all α ∈ (U×A)∗ and ul ∈L, if exec(α) 6= undef then [exec(α)]ul = [exec(PurgeH(α))]ul .
We prove by induction on the size of α .
Induction base: α = 〈〉. In this case PurgeH(α)= 〈〉, and therefore exec(α)= exec(PurgeH(α))=
s0. By the reflexivity of ∼NIL we have that exec(α)∼NILexec(PurgeH(α)).
Induction step: Suppose for some α ∈ (U×A)∗, exec(α) 6= undef implies exec(α)∼NILexec(PurgeH(α)).
We show that for all a ∈ A and u ∈ U it holds that exec(α ◦ (u,a)) 6= undef implies exec(α ◦
(u,a)) ∼NILexec(PurgeH(α ◦ (u,a))) (where ◦ denotes the concatenation operator). We consider
three cases:
i) If exec(α ◦ (u,a)) = undef then it holds that exec(α ◦ (u,a)) 6= undef implies
exec(α ◦ (u,a))∼NILexec(PurgeH(α ◦ (u,a))).
ii) If exec(α ◦(u,a)) 6= undef and u∈ L then firstly notice that exec(Purge(α ◦(u,a)) 6= undef . Be-
cause by induction step assumption and (OC) it holds that obs(exec(α),u)= obs(exec(PurgeH(α)),u)
and so because a∈ act(exec(α),u), by our model restrictions it holds that a∈ act(exec(PurgeH(α),u)).
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Therefore by exec(α)∼NILexec(PurgeH(α)) (induction step assumption), u∈ L, and (SC) we have
exec(α ◦ (u,a))∼NILexec(PurgeH(α ◦ (u,a))).
iii) If exec(α ◦ (u,a)) 6= undef and u ∈ H then by (LR) property of ∼NIL , exec(α) ∼NILexec(α ◦
(u,a)). By this, induction step assumption and PurgeH(α) = PurgeH(α ◦ (u,a)) we infer that
exec(α ◦ (u,a))∼NILexec(PurgeH(α ◦ (u,a))).
“⇒” Suppose that NIM(H,L), we show there exists an unwinding relation on the states of M.
Consider the relation∼ defined as follows: for any s, t ∈ St, s∼ t if for all α ∈ (U×A)∗ and uL ∈ L,
it holds that if exec(s,α) 6= undef and exec(t,α) 6= undef , then [exec(s,α)]uL = [exec(t,α))]uL . It
can easily be seen that ∼ is an equivalence relation, we prove that it satisfies (OC), (SC) and (LR)
properties.
(OC): If s ∼ t and we take α = 〈〉, by [exec(s,α)]uL = [exec(s,α)]uL it holds that [s]uL = [t]uLand
therefore ∼ satisfies (OC).
(SC): Suppose that for some s, t ∈ St, u ∈ L and a ∈ A such that s ∼ t, it holds that do(s,u,a) 6=
undef and do(s,u,a) 6∼ do(t,u,a). Then there exists α ∈ (U×A)∗, uL ∈L such that exec(do(s,u,a),α) 6=
undef , exec(do(t,u,a),α) 6= undef , and [exec(do(s,u,a),α)]uL 6= [exec(do(t,u,a),α))]uL . There-
fore [exec(s,((u,a)◦α)]uL 6= [exec(t,((u,a)◦α)]uL , which contradicts s∼ t.
(LR): Suppose that for some s ∈ St, u ∈ H and a ∈ A, it holds that do(s,u,a) 6= undef and
s 6∼ do(s,u,a). Then there exists α ∈ (U×A)∗, uL ∈ L such that exec(do(s,u,a),α) 6= undef ,
exec(s,α) 6= undef , and [exec(s,α)]uL 6= [exec(do(s,u,a),α))]uL . Because s is reachable, we have
that s= exec(β ) for some β ∈ (U×A)∗. Therefore [exec(β ◦α)]uL 6= [exec(β ◦ (u,a)◦α))]uL . But
this is a contradiction because by NIM(H,L) it holds that
[exec(β ◦ (u,a)◦α))]uL = [exec(PurgeH(β ◦ (u,a)◦α)))]uL and
[exec(β ◦α))]uL = [exec(PurgeH(β ◦α)))]uL and we have that
PurgeH(β ◦ (u,a)◦α) = PurgeH(β ◦α).
The rest of the proof of Theorem 7.6.1 follows analogously.
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Example 7.6.1. With PTS, the scenario from Example 7.3.1 can be modeled directly, without spu-
rious states that ruled out illegal transitions. Thus, our models Ma,Mb for the two variants of the
scenario are now exactly depicted in Figures 7.1 and 7.2.
The noninterferent idealised variants of Ma (resp. Mb) is again obtained by the unification of
observations init, noObs, MnameC, and MNameD (resp. init, noObs, MnameA, and MNameB).
Clearly, L has no surely winning strategy to guarantee Γ= ΓT for T= {s15,s16} in Ma, Ideal(Ma),
and Ideal(Mb). Moreover, he has a surely winning strategy in Mb. In consequence, Ma is effectively
information-secure for (L,Γ), but Mb is not. 
The noninterferent variant was indeed an idealisation in simple transition networks of Goguen
and Mesguer. Is it still the case in partial transition networks? That is, is it always the case that
L has no more abilities in Ideal(M) than in M? In general, no. On one hand, L’s observational
capabilities are more limited in Ideal(M), and in consequence some strategies in M are no longer
uniform in Ideal(M). On the other hand, unification U∗ possibly adds new transitions to M, that
can be used by L in Ideal(M) to construct new strategies. However, under some assumptions,
Ideal(M) does provide idealisation. First, notice that the potential additional strategic ability that
L players may gain in the Ideal(M) can only come from the added reflexive transitions. The only
way that L can harm the goal of the system using these reflexive transitions is by keeping the
system remaining in those states by continually selecting the reflexive actions. Consequently, the
following propositions are straightforward:
Proposition 7.6.3. Let M be a PTN such that for every state s in M there is a ∈ A and u ∈ L such
that do(s,u,a) = s. Then, for any Γ, we have that M L,Γ Ideal(M).
Proposition 7.6.4. For any PTN M and safety goal Γ, we have M L,Γ Ideal(M).
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7.7 Summary
In this chapter, we introduced the concept of effective information security. The idea is aimed
at assessing the relevance of information leakage in a system, based on how much the leakage
enables an adversary to harm the correct behaviour of the system. We say that two information
flows are effectively equivalent if the strategic ability of the adversary is similar in both of them.
Moreover, one of them is less effectively secure than the other one if the amount of information
leaked to the adversary in it increases the damaging ability of the adversary. In order to determine
how critical the information leakage in a given system is, we compare the damaging ability of the
adversary to his ability in the idealised variant of the model. We defined the idealised model based
on noninterference and showed that the construction is well defined. We proved this first for the
total-on-input models of Goguen and Meseguer, and then extended the results to non-total-on-input
structures that allow for a more flexible modelling of interaction.
Chapter 8
Expressing Receipt-Freeness and
Coercion-Resistance
in Logics of Strategic Ability
In this chapter, we focus on the strategic aspect of information security in voting procedures. We
argue that coercion-related properties are underpinned by existence (or nonexistence) of a suitable
strategy for some participants: typically for the voter, the coercer, or both. Such strategic behaviour
has been studied in game theory, social choice theory, and theory of multi-agent systems. In par-
ticular, a number of game logics have been proposed that can be used to specify properties related
to strategic ability. Here, we use formulae of the game logic ATL∗ to encode and disambiguate
different flavours of receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance.
Outline of the chapter. Section 8.1 explains the motivating idea of the contribution of this chapter.
Section 8.2 presents the syntax and semantics of the logic of strategic abilities ATL∗. In Section 8.3
we discuss some of the significant works that have given formal definitions of receipt-freeness and
coercion-resistance. We provide logical expressions for the informal definitions included in those
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works. Finally Section 8.4 concludes the chapter.
8.1 Motivation
In the existing literature, coercion-related properties are typically formulated on two levels of ab-
straction (For a more thorough literature review on formal definitions of coercion-resistance prop-
erties refer to Chapter 2.). On one hand, the informal intuition usually builds upon abilities of
participants in the interaction between the voter and the potential coercer. That is, it refers to the
existence or nonexistence of suitable strategies for players in the real game between the voter and
the coercer.
On the other hand, the formal definition specifies a mathematical structure to which the property
is related, and defines how to evaluate the property based on the structure. Some of the formal
definitions are game-based, but the games used there are primarily mathematical devices to define
the concept, much like in the case of the game semantics for first-order predicate logic, or the game
semantics of programming languages. It is not the real game between participants of the voting
process, but rather an abstract game between the “verifier” trying to prove the property true, and
the “falsifier” that attempts the opposite. Thus, strategy-based definitions of coercion-resistance
and receipt-freeness are either informal or use strategies that have no obvious relation to the real
behaviour of actual participants in the voting process. The closest work we know of, that has
formalized the coercion-resistance property as strategic abilities of the participants, is the work of
Kusters et al. [KTV10]. They have formalised the property as a quantitative measure showing how
well a coercer can distinguish between the strategy he has prescribed to the coerced voter and a
counter-strategy used by the voter. However for formalising the property they have also used a
cryptographic model, rather than a model oriented for specifying strategic abilities of players.
Our aim in this chapter is to provide logical “transcriptions” of the informal intuitions that can
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be found in the literature. It is important to mention that this is essentially a position chapter.
We put forward some specifications of the coercion related properties that can trigger discussions.
These discussions hopefully can lead to the improvement of the formalizations in the future. Also,
we do not claim that the formalizations we formulate in this chapter get the concepts of coercion-
resistance and receipt-freeness completely right. In fact, the issue whether they “get it right” is not
entirely well-formed, because the model and the semantics of the specifications are not formulated
precisely. Nevertheless, the transcriptions formally expose the strategic nature of coercion-related
properties, and allow to demonstrate some interesting differences between the existing approaches.
8.2 Logics of Strategic Ability
The idea behind here is to capture the intuitive meaning of coercion-related properties by for-
mal specifications that explicitly refer to the strategic interaction between the voter(s) and the
coercer(s). We will show a number of logical formulae that refer to the existence (or nonexistence)
of strategies to coerce (resp. to defend from coercion). To this end, we will use modal logics of
strategic ability, or modal game logics [BP88, AHK02, Sch04, CHP07, MMV10], that have gained
much popularity within Artificial Intelligence in the last 20 years.
There are many syntactic and semantic variants of game logics. In this work, we use alternating-
time temporal logic ATL whose formulae allow for expressing statements about the existence of a
surely winning strategy to achieve a given temporal goal.
8.2.1 What Agents Can Achieve: ATL and ATL*
Alternating-time temporal logic [AHK97, AHK02] generalizes branching-time temporal logic
CTL? [Eme90] by replacing path quantifiers E,A with strategic modalities 〈〈A〉〉. Informally,
〈〈A〉〉γ says that a group of agents A has a collective strategy to enforce temporal property γ . ATL∗
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formulas can include temporal operators: “ i” (“in the next state”), “2” (“always from now on”),
“3” (“now or sometime in the future”), and U (strong “until”). Similarly to CTL? and CTL, we
consider two syntactic variants of the alternating-time logic, namely ATL∗ and ATL.
Syntax. Formally, let U be a finite set of agents, and Π a countable set of atomic propositions. The
language of ATL∗ is defined as follows:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ϕ | 〈〈A〉〉γ ,
γ ::= ϕ | ¬γ | γ ∧ γ | iγ | γU γ .
where A ⊆ U and p ∈ Π. Derived boolean connectives and constants (∨,>,⊥) are defined as
usual. “Sometime”, “weak until”, and “always from now on” are defined as3γ ≡>U γ , γ1W γ2 ≡
¬((¬γ2)U (¬γ1∧¬γ2)), and 2γ ≡ γW⊥.
ATL (without “star”) is the syntactic variant in which strategic and temporal operators are
combined into compound modalities:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ϕ | 〈〈A〉〉 iϕ | 〈〈A〉〉ϕUϕ | 〈〈A〉〉ϕWϕ .
Models. The semantics of ATL∗ is defined over a variant of synchronous multi-agent transition
systems.
Definition 8.2.1 (CGS). A concurrent game structure (CGS) is a tuple M = 〈U,St,Act,d,o,Π,V 〉
which includes nonempty finite sets of: agents U= {1, . . . ,k}, states St, actions Act, atomic propo-
sitions Π, and a propositional valuation V : St → 2Π. The function d : U× St →P(Act) de-
fines availability of actions. The (deterministic) transition function o assigns a successor state
q′ = o(q,α1, . . . ,αk) to each state q ∈ St and any tuple of actions αi ∈ d(i,q) that can be executed
by U in q.
A pointed CGS is a pair (M,q0) consisting of a concurrent game structure M and an initial
state q0 in M.
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Figure 8.1 Autonomous vehicles at the intersection: model M1
Example 8.2.1 (Driving agents). Consider an intersection with k autonomous vehicles around it.
Each vehicle is modelled as a separate agent, whose local state is characterised by either the
proposition outi (when the vehicle is outside the intersection) or ini (when the vehicle is inside it).
The available actions are: in (“drive in” or “stay in”, depending on the current state) and out
(“drive out” or “stay out”). Transitions update the state accordingly, except for one case: when
both agents are in and decide to leave at the same time, a collision occurs (collision).
Figure 8.1 presents a pointed CGS modeling the scenario for k = 2. The combinations of
actions that are not displayed in the graph do not change the state of the system.
Strategies and their outcomes. Given a CGS, we define the strategies and their outcomes as
follows. A strategy for a is a function sa : St → Act such that sa(q) ∈ d(a,q).1 The set of such
1This corresponds to the notion of memoryless or positional strategies. In other words, we assume that the memory
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strategies is sometimes denoted by ΣIra , with the capital “I” referring to perfect Information, and
the lowercase “r” for possibly imperfect recall. A collective strategy for a group of agents A =
{a1, . . . ,ar} is a tuple of individual strategies sA = 〈sa1, . . . ,sar〉. The set of such strategies is
denoted by ΣIrA .
A path λ = q0q1q2 . . . in a CGS is an infinite sequence of states such that there is a transition
between each qi,qi+1. λ [i] denotes the ith position on λ (starting from i = 0) and λ [i,∞] the suffix
of λ starting with i. The “outcome” function out(q,sA) returns the set of all paths that can occur
when agents A execute strategy sA from state q onward. Function out(q,sA) returns the set of all
paths λ ∈ Stω that may occur when agents A execute strategy sA from state q onward, defined as
follows:
out(q,sA) = {λ = q0,q1,q2 . . . | q0 = q and for each i= 0,1, . . . there exists 〈α ia1, . . . ,α iak〉 such that
α ia ∈ da(qi) for every a∈U, and α ia = sA[a](qi) for every a∈A, and qi+1 = o(qi,α ia1 , . . . ,α iak)}.
Semantics. The semantics of ATL∗ is defined by the following clauses:
M,q |= p iff q ∈ V(p), for p ∈Π;
M,q |= ¬ϕ iff M,q 6|= ϕ;
M,q |= ϕ1∧ϕ2 iff M,q |= ϕ1 and M,q |= ϕ2;
M,q |= 〈〈A〉〉γ iff there is a strategy sA ∈ ΣIrA such that, for each path λ ∈ out(q,sA), we have
M,λ |= γ .
M,λ |= ϕ iff M,λ [0] |= ϕ;
M,λ |= ¬γ iff M,λ 6|= γ;
M,λ |= γ1∧ γ2 iff M,λ |= γ1 and M,λ |= γ2;
M,λ |= iγ iff M,λ [1,∞] |= γ; and
of agents is explicitly defined by the states of the model.
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M,λ |= γ1U γ2 iff there is an i∈N0 such that M,λ [i,∞] |= γ2 and M,λ [ j,∞] |= γ1 for all 0≤ j < i.
Example 8.2.2 (Driving agents, ctd.). For model M1, we have M1,qoo |= 〈〈1〉〉2¬collision: agent 1
can avoid the collision forever (the obvious strategy is to never enter the crossroads). On the other
hand, the agent cannot ensure the collision even if it wants to: M1,qoo |= ¬〈〈1〉〉3collision. This
can only be guaranteed if the agents cooperate: M1,qoo |= 〈〈1,2〉〉3collision. Moreover, M1,qoo |=
〈〈1〉〉3in1∧〈〈2〉〉3in2: each agent is able to enter the intersection. Still, it cannot successfully drive
through the crossroads on its own (e.g., M1,qoo 6|= 〈〈1〉〉3(in1 ∧3out1)). Finally, if the agents
cooperate, they can make sure that they successfully drive through the crossroads: M1,qoo |=
〈〈1,2〉〉3(in1∧3out1).
8.2.2 Abilities under Imperfect Information
ATL∗ was originally proposed for reasoning about agents in perfect information scenarios. How-
ever, realistic multi-agent interaction always includes some degree of limited observability [Sch04,
JvdH04, Ågo06, HT06, JÅ07, Sch10]. Here, we use the classical variant of “ATL∗ with imperfect
information” from [Sch04], defined as follows.
First, we extend concurrent game structures with indistinguishability relations ∼1, . . . ,∼k, one
per agent in U. Now, strategies must specify identical choices in indistinguishable situations. That
is, strategies with imperfect information (ir strategies, for short) are functions sa : St → Act such
that (1) sa(q) ∈ d(a,q), and (2) if q∼a q′ then sa(q) = sa(q′).2 As before, collective strategies for
A⊆ U are tuples of individual strategies for a ∈ A. We denote the set of A’s imperfect information
strategies by ΣirA.
The semantics of “ATL∗ with imperfect information” differs from the one presented in Sec-
tion 8.2.1 only in the clause for strategic modality:
2Again, we consider only positional strategies here.
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M,q |= 〈〈A〉〉γ iff there is a strategy sA ∈ ΣirA such that, for every agent a ∈ A, state q′ such that
q∼a q′, and path λ ∈ out(q′,sA), we have that M,λ |= γ .
In other words, the agents in A should have an executable strategy which enforces γ from all the
states that at least one member of the coalition considers possible.
Example 8.2.3 (Intersection with limited visibility). Take model M1 from Example 8.2.1, and as-
sume that no agent sees the location of the other vehicle. This can be modeled by the following
indistinguishability relations: qoo ∼1 qoi and qii ∼1 qio; qoo ∼2 qio and qoi ∼2 qii. Now, we still
have e.g. that M2,qoo |= 〈〈1〉〉2¬collision (it suffices that agent 1 executes action “out” regardless
of anything) On the other hand, M2,qoo |= ¬〈〈1,2〉〉3collision (the agents cannot make sure that
a collision will happen, even if they want to). We leave it up to the interested reader to check the
latter.
8.2.3 Knowledge and Belief Modalities
Coercion-resistance and receipt-freeness are privacy-type properties. In this sense, they are related
to the knowledge and/or beliefs of the adversary about a given secret. In the case of elections,
the secret is usually the value of the voter’s vote. Thus, we will need modalities for knowledge
(resp. beliefs). The former is formalised by epistemic formulae of type Kaϕ , expressing that agent
a knows that ϕ holds, with the following semantics:
M,q |= Kaϕ iff, for every state q′ such that q∼a q′, we have that M,q′ |= ϕ .
It is interesting to observe that this modality is in fact superfluous in “ATL∗ with imperfect infor-
mation,” since we can equivalently express Kaϕ by 〈〈a〉〉ϕUϕ .
The modality for beliefs is very similar. Baϕ expresses that a believes that φ holds, and exactly
the same semantic clause can be used to interpret Kaϕ and Baϕ . The difference lies in the axiomatic
properties. For knowledge, the indistinguishability relation is assumed to be an equivalence (i.e.,
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reflexive, symmetric, and transitive), whereas for beliefs it is sufficient to have it serial, symmetric
and Euclidean. Thus, whenever the indistinguishability relation ∼a is an equivalence, one can use
Ka to address the subjective view of player a; otherwise Ba should be used.
8.3 Expressing Informal Definitions of Coercion-Related Prop-
erties
In order to express security properties of a voting system, we assume that the voting process is
modelled as a concurrent game structure where the set of players U includes the set of voters V , the
coercer c, and possibly some other players. Let Bal be the set of possible “ballot values,” i.e., ways
in which a ballot can be cast by a voter. In a simple majority voting procedure where each voter
votes for one of the candidates, Bal is the set of candidates. We assume that the states where voter
v ∈ V has already voted are labelled by the atomic proposition votedv,i, where i ∈ Bal indicates
how v voted.
For this work, we have chosen several important papers on preventing coercion in elections. In
each of the papers, an informal intuition is first given and later followed by a formal definition that
typically uses some heavy mathematical machinery. Here, we only look at the informal intuitions
to provide their transcriptions in the game logic ATL∗. To make the list easier to read, we label the
properties to be transcribed as either (RFx) for variants of receipt-freeness properties, and (CRx)
for variants of coercion-resistance.
8.3.1 Benaloh and Tuinstra (1994)
(RF1) For a voting system to be uncoercable, no voter should be able to convince any other
participant of the value of its vote. [BT94]
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This paper introduced the notion of receipt-freeness. They used some examples to show why
giving a “receipt” to the voter can be harmful, as it prevents the voter from being able to deceive the
coercer. Therefore through the paper “uncoercibility” is regarded equivalent to receipt-freeness.
For expressing this definition, we need to interpret two terms to convince’ and other partici-
pants. We can consider “other participants” to be the set of all voters, or to be the set of all players.
The more subtle term to interpret is “to convince”. It can both mean to prove to someone about
one’s vote value, and to make someone believe that the voter has voted in a particular way. In the
first case, the knowledge modality is the right one to use and in the second case the belief modality.
However, because in this definition “being unable to convince” is used only for the actual vote of
the voter, we decide to use knowledge modality for expressing the property. Therefore definition
(RF1), if we consider “other participants” to be the set of voters, can be expressed as:
∧
v,v′∈V\{c}
v 6=v′
∧
i∈Bal
¬〈〈v〉〉3(votedv,i∧Kv′votedv,i),
or if we consider “other participants” to be any other player in the model:
∧
v∈V
∧
a∈U
v6=a
∧
i∈Bal
¬〈〈v〉〉3(votedv,i∧Kavotedv,i).
Note that
∧
is not a first-order quantifier but a conjunction of finitely many subformulae. Thus,
the above specifications are propositional modal formulae of finite length.
8.3.2 Juels, Catalano, and Jakobsson (2005)
This paper introduced the notion of coercion-resistance property as an improvement over receipt-
freeness. We start by the definition of receipt-freeness as given in this work:
(RF2) Receipt-freeness is the inability of a voter to prove to an attacker that she voted in a par-
8.3 Expressing Informal Definitions of Coercion-Related Properties 112
ticular manner, even if the voter wishes to do so. [JCJ05]
This definition is very similar to (RF1) The difference is that instead of any other player, we
use a coercer player as the adversary. Although one might think the two interpretations imply each
other, they can, in fact, have different nuances. One may define specific abilities for the adversaries
in the model that are different from those accessible to the voters, or other players in the system.
Also, one might consider some (maybe powerful) players in the model as trustworthy and decide
not to include them in the set of coercers. The definition (RF2) then can be expressed as follows:
∧
v∈V\{c}
∧
i∈Bal
¬〈〈v〉〉3(votedv,i∧Kcvotedv,i).
The definition of the coercion-resistance property given in this paper is meant to give extra
protection, where receipt-freeness fails to protect an election system against several forms of se-
rious, real-world attack, specifically against randomization attacks, forced abstention attacks, and
simulation attacks. In randomization attack, the coercer asks the voter to use some randomization
method for choosing her vote. In forced abstention attack the attacker wants the voter to avoid
voting in the election, and in simulation attack, the attacker himself simulate the role of the voter
(for example by causing her to divulge her private keying material after the registration, but before
the election process).
(CR1) A coercion-resistant voting system is one in which the user can deceive the adversary into
thinking that she has behaved as instructed, when the voter has in fact cast a ballot according
to her own intentions. [JCJ05]
This definition includes instructions of the coercer to the voter. The paper explains that these
instructions can be voting for a specific candidate, but also abstaining from voting, randomising
the vote, and in general any specific behaviour during the election process. Here, we focus only
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on instructing to vote for a specific candidate and abstaining from voting, and we discuss the other
cases later. Notice that in this definition, the voter intends to deceive the adversary to accept the
voter has voted in a way which is not the actual vote of the voter. This means that the knowledge
modality cannot be used here because in classical epistemic logic, knowledge about a proposition
implies the truth of it in all possible worlds. Hence we use belief modalities in this case. The -
narrowly interpreted - expression of definition (CR1) then can be as follows:
∧
v∈V\{c}
∧
i, j∈Bal
〈〈v〉〉3(votedv,i∧Bcvotedv,j).
8.3.3 Delaune, Kremer, and Ryan (2005)
(RF3) An election protocol is receipt-free if a voter A cannot prove to a potential coercer C that
she voted in a particular way. We assume that A wishes to cooperate with C; receipt-freeness
guarantees that such cooperation will not be worthwhile, because it will be impossible for C
to obtain proof about how A voted. [DKR05]
The paper proposed a formalization of receipt-freeness in applied pi calculus. Here, unlike the
previous definitions, a cooperation between the coercer and the voter has been mentioned explicitly.
Expressing this definition can be as follows:
∧
v∈V\{c}
∧
i∈Bal
¬〈〈c,v〉〉3(votedv,i∧Kcvotedv,i).
It is important to note that in the semantics of ATL, the existence of a collective strategy for
a group of players doesn’t imply that the players are committed to follow that strategy. It also
doesn’t necessary mean that each player has a way of distinguishing whether the other players in
the coalition are following the strategy or not. To show how these affect the definition, suppose in
some election the voter has options of voting for candidates A or B. Then she can choose a receipt
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for either candidates A or B. This is entirely the voter’s choice and both choices are offered no
matter which vote was cast. The voter then can give the receipt to the coercer. It is clear that there
is always a strategy for the voter of voting for a candidate and always taking the receipt for that
candidate. Under that strategy, in all possible executions of the system the coercer knows which
way the voter has voted. Therefore the voter and the coercer have a joint cooperative strategy in
which the coercer knows how the voter voted. However it is obvious that such a system cannot
be considered to be receipt-free. This problem arises because in ATL, the transcription of the
definition given above, does not enforce the voter to follow the (agreed) strategy, nor does it imply
that the coercer can distinguish whether the voter has diverged from the strategy or not. For having
these properties we need a more expressive language than ATL. We will mention this issue again
while talking about the future works in Chapter 9.
8.3.4 Moran and Naor (2006)
(RF4) A voting system is receipt free, if a voter is unable to convince a third party of her vote
even if she wants to do so. [MN06]
This work gives a formal definition for receipt-freeness in computation model. The differences
between this definition and (RF3) is that firstly here the adversary can be any other player, and
secondly the term “to convince” is used instead of “to prove”. We can include the latter by replacing
the knowledge modality with belief modality. So (RF4) can be expressed as follows:
∧
v∈V
∧
a∈U
v 6=a
∧
i∈Bal
¬〈〈v〉〉3(votedv,i∧Bavotedv,i).
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8.3.5 Backes, Hritcu, and Maffei (2008)
(RF5) A voting system satisfies receipt-freeness, if a coercer cannot force a voter to cast a certain
vote and to provide a receipt that would certify her vote. [BHM08]
This paper provided a formalisation of coercion-resistance and receipt-freeness in applied pi
calculus. A key term in the informal definition here is “to force”. Because there is not a way to
exactly express forcing someone to do something in ATL, we interpret it as though the coercer
has a way to make voter to commit to a mutual strategy. In this way, forcing the voter can be
interpreted as having a mutual strategy with the voter. The other key term here is “the receipt”.
Again, for being able to express the informal definition in ATL, we replace the concept of existence
of a receipt’ with a more general concept of existence a strategy to prove the value of the vote. With
these interpretations we can express the definition as follows, which is similar to (RF3):
∧
v∈V\{c}
∧
i∈Bal
¬〈〈c,v〉〉3(votedv,i∧Kcvotedv,i).
8.3.6 Delaune, Kremer, and Ryan (2010)
(RF6) A voting system is receipt free, if the voter does not obtain any artefact (a “receipt”) which
can be used later to prove to another party how she voted. [DKR10]
Here again similar to definition (RF5), we translate the having a receipt to having a strategy to
prove the value of the vote. Therefore the definition can be expressed as:
∧
v∈V
∧
a∈U
v6=a
∧
i∈Bal
¬〈〈v〉〉3(votedv,i∧Kavotedv,i).
(CR2) A voting system is coercion-resistant, if the link between a voter and her vote cannot be
established by an attacker, even if the voter cooperates with the attacker during the election
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process. We assume that the voter and the attacker can communicate and exchange data at
any time during the election process. [DKR10]
If we translate establishing a link between a voter and her vote by knowing the value of the
vote of the voter, then this definition can be expressed similar to definitions (RF3) and (RF5):
∧
v∈V\{c}
∧
i∈Bal
¬〈〈c,v〉〉3(votedv,i∧Kcvotedv,i).
On the other hand, if we take it as a more general concept of finding any correlation between
the voter and his vote, then we can express it as:
∧
v∈V\{c}
∧
i∈Bal
¬〈〈c,v〉〉3(votedv,i∧
∨
j∈Bal\{i}
Kc¬votedv,j).
8.3.7 Kusters, Truderung and Vogt (2010)
(CR3) A voting system is coercion-resistant, if there exists a counter-strategy for the voter such
that the coercer cannot tell whether the coerced voter is in fact following the coercer’s in-
structions or whether she is just running the counter-strategy, and hence, achieves her own
goal. [KTV10]
The counter-strategy of the voter in this definition has to satisfy two conditions. Firstly it has
to be indistinguishable from the instructed strategy of the coercer and secondly, makes the voter
achieves her goal. Here again, we focus only on the simple case where the coercer’s instruction
is basically voting for a certain candidate, and the goal of the voter is voting for her preferred
candidate. The definition then can be expressed as follows:
∧
v∈V\{c}
∧
i, j∈Bal
i6= j
〈〈v〉〉3(votedv,i∧2¬Kc¬votedv,j).
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That is, the voter always has a strategy to eventually vote for her preferred candidate, and be sure
that the coercer never finds out that she has disobeyed his instruction.
8.3.8 Randomization and Forced Abstention Attacks
In several definitions of coercion-resistance, like (CR1), the security property is meant to satisfy
receipt-freeness but also protect against forced abstention attacks and randomization attack. We
have omitted those kinds attacks in the previous subsections. Here, we tentatively suggest how
resistance to randomization and forced abstention attacks can be specified.
Randomization attack happens when the coercer wants the voter to cast her vote in a way that
the result follows some probability distribution, for example, uniform distribution over the set of
candidates. However, if the coercer instructs the voter to “vote at random with a uniform dis-
tribution over the candidates”, he will have no way of checking whether the voter followed his
instruction. Therefore, in the case of election, a randomization attack is possible only when there
exist a more tangible property (from the point of view of the coercer) for verifying the randomness
of a single cast vote. It must be, at least in principle, possible for the coercer to verify the property
based on the actual sequence of events (and not the voter’s behaviour as a whole, which is inacces-
sible to the coercer). For example in Prêt à Voter [CRS05, Rya10], the list of candidates are printed
in a entirely random way on each ballot. Therefore if the coercer asks the voter to “cross the first
slot in the ballot”, this is potentially verifiable, and indirectly it implies random voting of the voter.
In fact, the voter always has the possibility of auditing a ballot and obtaining a new one, so the
voter has a counter strategy to get a ballot with her candidate in the coercer specified position, but
of course this would be tedious to execute for complex ballots.
To make this idea more general, we can represent feasible randomization attacks by a state
property p, such that the occurrence of p implies random behaviour of the voter, in the way in-
tended by the coercer. For example, the above scenario can be represented by p ≡ crossedv,1,
8.4 Summary 118
where crossedv,n expresses that voter v has crossed the nth slot on the ballot. Then, resistance to
randomization attacks can be approximated by the following formula:
∧
v∈V\{c}
¬〈〈c,v〉〉3Kcp.
That is, there is no collective strategy for the coercer and the voter (even assuming that they
fully cooperate) such that at some point the coercer will know that p has occurred, and hence
conclude that the voter has followed his instruction.
Forced abstention attack happens when the coercer wants the voter to behave such that her vote
does not affect the final ballot counting result. It can be only asking the voter not to cast a vote, but
also can be wanting the voter to cast a vote in a way that is considered a spoilt vote. For the case
of asking for casting a spoilt vote, the formalisation can be similar to the case of randomization
attack, where the occurrence of a potentially verifiable state property p means that the voter casts
a spoilt vote. For the case where the coercer asks the voter not to participate in the election(or not
to cast a vote) the protection against forced abstention attack can be expressed as follows:
∧
v∈V\{c}
¬〈〈c,v〉〉2
( ∧
i∈Bal
¬votedv,i∧Kc
∧
i∈Bal
¬votedv,i
)
.
That is, there is no collective strategy for the coercer and the voter such that at any time after the
end of the election time, the coercer knows that the voter has voted for a candidate (any candidate,
even if the coercer cannot figure out which one).
8.4 Summary
In this chapter, we have provided logical transcriptions of the informal form of the definitions of the
coercion-resistance and receipt-freeness properties that can be found in the literature. Our focus
8.4 Summary 119
in these transcriptions was to show the role of strategic abilities of the participants in an election
system in defining coercion related properties. To this end, we used formulae of the game logic
ATL∗ for expressing these properties, and demonstrated some differences between the existing
approaches.
Chapter 9
Conclusions and Future Work
In this dissertation, we used game theoretic approaches for analysing security properties within
three separate strands of work. In the following, for each strand, we summarise the main results
and contribution of the thesis, and present a few suggestions for future work.
Strand 1: Preventing Coercion in Elections. The primary objective of this strand was to model
and analyse an election system in the presence of potential coercers, in order to find optimised
strategies for the decision makers of the election, and to minimise the risk and expected damage of
coercion.
We presented simple game models for an election with the possibility of coercion. The models
are two-person non-zero-sum noncooperative games, where one player represents the society and
the other a potential coercer in the election. We considered both complete information and incom-
plete information settings where the players are not sure about the number of voters that the coercer
needs to coerce to change the result of the election in his favour. In the incomplete information
setting, we have studied both the uniform distribution and normal distribution for the number of
voters needed to be coerced. We showed that in all the games we considered, Stackelberg equilib-
rium is different from Nash equilibrium, and also the Stackelberg equilibrium does not coincide
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with maxmin. It means that it is in the interest of the society not to adapt to the expected strategy
of the coercer. Rather, the society should decide on its coercion-resistance policy in advance, an-
nounce it openly and commit to using it. This way, the coercer is best off when refraining from
coercion altogether.
For future work, it would be interesting to study models where the game consists of multiple
coercers whose interests conflict. Extending models to include incomplete information of players
about other aspects of the game, like the value of coercion for the coercer, or the cost of bribing
voters, is another possible line of research for future work.
Strand 2: Information Flow Security and Strategic Abilities of Players. The first objective
of this strand was to define a weaker notion of noninterference as an information flow security
property, by considering the strategic ability of High players and their incentive to ensure the
correct behaviour of the system.
We proposed how to relax the classical requirement of noninterference by taking into account
a strategy that the High players may follow in order to achieve their goals. The idea is of particular
importance for the design and analysis of confidentiality in realistic systems where full nonin-
terference and nondeducibility can seldom be guaranteed. Moreover, strategic noninterference in
a system can be obtained not only by strengthening security measures, but also by “fine-tuning”
functionality requirements: even if it does not hold for the current goals, there may exist weaker yet
still acceptable goals that allow for confidentiality-preserving behaviour. Thus, the new concept
helps to realise which objectives can be achieved while avoiding information leakage.
Regarding the technical results, we studied the characterisation of strategic noninterference
through unwinding relations. On the one hand, we proved that a general characterisation result is
impossible for arbitrary goals. On the other hand, we presented some characterizations for specific
subclasses of goals and for the simplified setting where a strategy is given as a parameter. The
proofs are constructive and can be used to obtain practical algorithms that check for strategic non-
122
interference. We also showed that, in the classical models of Goguen and Meseguer, knowing the
strategy of High players usually does not increase the ability of Low players to break noninterfer-
ence. It is worth mentioning that, in a realistic system, the usefulness of strategic noninterference
relies heavily on the ability of High players to select specific behaviours. In a system where High
players have no such ability, the notions of noninterference and strategic noninterference coincide.
The models we used are deterministic asynchronous transition networks of the original defi-
nition of noninterference [GM82]. We plan to extend our study to richer models in future work.
In particular, the generalised form of non-interference by Ryan and Schneider [RS01] seems very
promising for a formulation of strategic noninterference in process-algebraic models.
The second objective of this strand was to study the significance of information flow in a
system, based on its influence on increasing the strategic ability of the adversary to harm the goal
of the system.
As our contribution in this line of work, we introduced the concept of effective information
security. The idea is aimed at assessing the relevance of information leakage in a system, based on
the extent to which the leakage enables an adversary to harm the correct behaviour of the system.
This is in contrast with the common approach to information flow security where revealing any
information is seen as being intrinsically harmful. We say that two information flows are effectively
equivalent if the strategic ability of the adversary is similar in both of them. Moreover, one of them
is less effectively secure than the other one if the amount of information leaked to the adversary in
it increases the damaging ability of the adversary.
To determine how critical the information leakage is in a given system, we compare the damag-
ing ability of the adversary to his ability in the idealised variant of the model. We defined idealised
models based on noninterference, and show that the construction is well defined. We proved this
first for the deterministic, fully asynchronous transition networks of Goguen and Meseguer, and
then extended the results to structures that allow for a more flexible modelling of interaction. The
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construction includes an algorithm that computes the idealised variant of each model in polynomial
time with respect to the size of the model.
Note that the concept of noninterference in our construction of effective security can be in
principle replaced by an arbitrary property of information flow. The same reasoning scheme could
be applied to noninference, nondeducibility, strategic noninterference, and so on. The pattern
does not change: given a property P , we define the idealised variant of M through the minimal
unification U such that U(M) satisfiesP . Then, M is effectively information-secure in the context
of propertyP iff it is strategically equivalent to U(M). Therefore one suggestion for future work
is to investigate which information security properties have unique minimal unifications.
Moreover, we plan to work on a more refined version of effective information security based
on coalitional effectivity functions [AK91], in which the strategic ability of the adversary is not
only compared at the initial state of the system, but across the whole state space. This will allow
us to achieve a more refined comparison between the security of different information flows.
Strand 3: Expressing Receipt-Freeness and Coercion-Resistance in Logics of Strategic Abil-
ity. The main objective of this strand was to use logics of strategic ability to provide “transcrip-
tions” of informal intuitions behind the definitions of receipt-freeness and coercion resistance prop-
erties in the literature.
In this line of work, we chose some of the significant works in the literature that have provided
formal definitions of coercion-resistance and receipt-freeness, and used formulae of the game logic
ATL∗ for expressing the informal form of the definitions in these works. Our objective in these
transcriptions was to show the role of strategic abilities of the participants in defining coercion
related security properties, and to demonstrate some differences between the existing approaches
to these properties.
There are many possible paths for future work. Among other things, we plan to refine our
specifications using the more flexible language of Strategy Logic [MMV10, FMV12, MMPV14]
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that allows for explicit quantification over strategies in k-player concurrent games. In particular,
this should allow for a more general specification of resistance to randomization and abstention
attacks, by directly encoding the fact that the coercer is unable to distinguish between the actual
behaviour of the voter and the behaviour prescribed by the coercer.
Perhaps more importantly, we will try to map the formal definitions of receipt-freeness and
coercion resistance from [BT94, JCJ05, DKR05, MN06, BHM08, DKR10, KTV10] to models and
formulae of game logics, in order to study the precise relationship between the informal intuitions
and their formalizations. Adapting the ATL model checking algorithms so that they can be used to
verify coercion-related properties is the third line of research that we envisage for future research.
Finally, we plan to study how opacity, as defined by Bryans et al. [BKMR05, BKR05] can be
expressed in ATL, and more specifically how to define coercion-resistance as a flavour of opacity,
similar to the style suggested in [PR06].
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